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Previous studies of civil-military gap have argued that the difference in 
values, perspectives, and opinions between civilians and the military matters becau e 
it determines military effectiveness, but empirical analyses of the relationship have 
been rare in civil-military relations scholarship. This study also found that the 
existing studies on this topic have theoretical and methodological weaknesses, and 
this makes it difficult to draw a meaningful conclusion about the implications of 
civil-military gap for military effectiveness.  
This dissertation attempted to fill this void by examining the impact of 
ideology and military experience gap on defense spending, an element of military 
effectiveness.  This study employed two measurements for the dependent variable, 
defense spending: defense outlays and defense budget authority.  Specifically, th s 
study tested if the ideological gap between the United States Congress and the 
military has any causal impact of defense spending level.  It also examined whether 
the level of military experience in United States Congress and Cabinet influ nces 
defense spending. This study covers the period between 1952 and 2000. Multivariate 
Ordinary Least Squares analyses were employed to estimate the coefficients. Control 
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variables such as external threat and partisan control of the presidency were includ d 
in the analyses.  
This study presents four major findings. First, the ideology and military 
experience gap did not have any independent effect on two measures of defense 
spending.  Second, to the extent that ideology and military experience gap exhibit a 
meaningful impact on defense spending, the results show they have interaction 
effects.  Specifically, I found that the ideology gap has a positive interaction effect 
with Republican administrations.  This effect was confined to defense budget 
authority.  As for the military experience gap, this study found that it has an 
interaction effect with external threats.  This effect was shown in two measures of 
defense spending.   
Third, contrary to conventional wisdom, the results indicate that Democratic 
administrations spend more on national defense than Republican administrations. 
This pattern was clear for defense budget authority. The same difference was also 
observable for defense outlays when I excluded the Reagan years from the analys s. 
Finally, external threats are demonstrated to be an important and consistent factor 
that has a positive relationship with both measures of defense spending.  
In closing, this study calls for scholarly efforts to reevaluate our 
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1. Controversies in the 1990s  
 Many events in the late 1980s and early 1990s appeared to usher in a new era 
in human history.  The U.S. Cold War nemesis, the Soviet Union, imploded from 
inside.  Many international relations theorists who had expected a relatively stab e 
international system with a bipolar structure found themselves baffled because of 
this unexpected development.1  The end of the ideological conflicts, which lasted for 
over four decades, led Francis Fukuyama to announce “the end of history.”2  The 
unprecedented sweeping military victory in the Gulf War of 1991 seemed to reaffirm 
the beginning of what President George H. Bush called a “new world order,” which 
would be characterized by peace, prosperity, and cooperation under the leadership of 
the U.S. as the sole super power in the world.  In an address before a joint session of 
the Congress in the aftermath of the Gulf War, President Bush described:  
Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided—a world of 
barbed wire and concrete block, conflict, and cold war.  
Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is 
the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston 
Churchill, a world order in which "the principles of justice and fair play 
protect the weak against the strong. . . ." A world where the United Nations, 
freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its 
founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a 
                                                
1 JL Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security 17, 
no. 3 (1992); RN Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," 
International Organization 48, no. 02 (1994); WC Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold 
War," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994). 
2 F Fukuyama, "The End of History," National Interest 16(1989). 
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home among all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. And 
my fellow Americans, we passed that test.3  
 
 What many did not foresee was a new set of controversies in American civil-
military relations throughout the 1990s.  The controversies extended from foreign 
policy decisions to sexual scandals and domestic policies.  The magnitude of the 
controversies was so unprecedented that many scholars and observers gave them th  
egregious name of a “crisis” in U.S. civil-military relations.  It seemd that the end 
of the Cold War opened Pandora’s Box, unleashing a variety of tensions between 
civilians and the military.   
 In foreign policy decision making, especially regarding use of force, many 
argued that the military wielded an unduly influence, challenging civilian authority 
to determine when and how to use military force.  The most obtrusive instance was 
the role that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell played in 
the decision making process over military operations in Bosnia.  In interviews with 
media and in a few op-eds, Powell expressed his concerns over the limited use of 
force by saying “As soon as they tell me it’s limited, it means they do not care 
whether you achieve a result or not.  As soon as they tell me it’s ‘surgical,’ I head for 
the bushes.”4  Many scholars criticized his behavior saying it breached the norm of 
military professionalism that instills military officers with a sen  of limited 
competence only in military affairs.  For example, Weigley argued that Powell’s 
                                                
3 George H.  Bush, "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian 
Gulf Conflict," (March 6, 1991). The transcript of the presidential address can be assessed at 
http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=urrent_event&code=bush_admin&year=0391 
4 C Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992. 
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open disagreement with the civilian leadership about military intervention in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina went against the principle of civilian supremacy5, which says that 
“civilians have a right to be wrong.”6   
Andrew Bacevich and Richard Kohn maintained that the military had 
become very partisan and closely affiliated with the Republican Party.7  They argued 
that the military’s public opposition to the Clinton administration’s limited use of 
military force in Bosnia and Haiti was motivated by partisan considerations.  
Bacevich and Kohn further argued that strong Republican partisanship in the mili ary 
would only undermine military professionalism and effectiveness, placing the 
institution in the middle of partisan politics, which required it to take sides.   
 A similar concern was raised in defense policy issues, especially the ones 
related to defense strategy and force structure in the post-Cold War era.  Observers 
viewed Colin Powell’s initiative in formulating and pushing the base force 
concept—which was a plan for reducing the size of the U.S. military by about 25 
percent—as beyond what the military was expected to do: He usurped civilian 
authority.8  They also argued that General Powell took a preemptive step to direct the 
debate over the adequate level and structure of military force in the post-Cold War 
                                                
5 RF Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from Mcclellan to 
Powell," The Journal of Military History (1993). 
6 PD Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 216. 
7 Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans - Has the US Military 
Become a Partisan Force," The New Republic 23, no. 8 (1997). 




period.9  Powell’s initiative set the terms of the debates over the force structure, 
narrowing civilian leaders’ options.  The resulting force reduction was substantial, 
but “it outran the resources that either Bush or Clinton were willing to provide.”10  
Others suggested the U.S. squandered a valuable opportunity to fundamentally 
restructure its forces by letting the military set framework that included the details of 
force reduction.11   
 Disputes over military personnel policy were also seen as indications of bad
civil-military relations.  Some lamented that the military opposition to homosexuals 
in the military and an expanded role for women was based on the unwarranted idea 
that liberal civilians were trying to demilitarize the institution.  A careful 
examination of the impact of the policy on military effectiveness was evidently 
secondary to political considerations.12  From this perspective, the military was not 
only failing to reform itself, but it was also opposing legitimate civilian ntervention.  
The military was unable to keep pace with a changing society.  Others observed that 
the military’s isolation and lack of diverse representation originated from its position 
as the moral bastion in American society.13  The coordinated effort of the military 
                                                
9 PD Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian 
Control," Armed forces and society 23(1996). 
10 EA Cohen, "Playing Powell Politics: The General's Zest for Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 6 
(1995): 108. 
11 David Isenberg, "The Pentagon's Fradulent Bottom-up Review," Policy Analysis no. 206(1994), 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1065 (accessed May 12, 2010). 
12 Elizabeth Kier, "Homosexuals in the US Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness," 
International Security 23, no. 2 (1998); DM Britton and CL Williams, "" Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't 
Pursue": Military Policy and the Construction of Heterosexual Masculinity," Journal of 
homosexuality 30(1995). 
13 Thomas Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society 




and Republican lawmakers in opposition to minority policies was also seen as 
indicative of growing conservatism and politicization of the military. 
 
2. Statement of the Problem: Gap Thesis and Its Weaknesses 
In an effort to explain the tensions between civilians and the military in the 
1990s, various theoretical approaches have been proposed.14  One of these 
approaches is the so-called culture gap thesis, often known simply as gap thesis. The 
main idea of this approach is that an increasing or decreasing gap between civilians 
and the military—in terms of values, attitudes, and opinions—explains changes in 
the civil-military relations.  According to this perspective, when the gap between 
civilians and the military increases, it has a negative influence on civil-military 
relations due to the decreasing level of mutual understanding and respect for each 
                                                
14 Other approaches include structuralist and institutionalist approaches. First, Desch presents a 
structuralist theory in which basically two independ t variables, external and internal threat, explain 
the level of civilian control of the military. According to this theory, it is when external threat is high 
and internal threat is low that civilian control is strongly established because the military maintains  
externally oriented military doctrine. He argues thi  explains what happened during the Cold War era. 
The end of the Cold War and the resulting ease of external threat made this equilibrium broken, 
making civilian control somewhat problematic. He recommends that the adoption of externally 
oriented military doctrine would reestablish civilian control of the military. See Michael C. Desch, 
"Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control," 
Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 3 (1998); ———, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing 
Security Environment (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). The second 
approach is an agency theory based on an institutionalist framework. In Feaver’s agency theory, two 
main independent variables, monitoring and punishment echanisms, that determine working or 
shirking of the military. According to this theory, during the post-Cold War era, while civilians’ 
ability to monitor the military’s behavior remained high due to the low monitoring costs, the 
expectation that the military would be punished when they shirk decreased, giving the military an 
incentive to shirk. Feaver sees the civil-military tensions during the 1990s as caused by military 
shirking, indicating weakening in civilian control. See P Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, 
and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ Pr, 2005); Feaver, "The Civil-Military 
Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." 
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other.15  For proponents of the gap thesis, therefore, the controversies in the 1990s 
were understood as symptoms that indicted a growing.   
Scholarly interests in the nature and extent of the gap have covered a wide 
range of issues including political affiliation, and social, foreign and defens 
policies.16  Particularly relevant to this study are the following two aspects of gap 
thesis findings.  First, researchers found that conservatism is quite strong in the 
military.  Holsti found, based on one of the most comprehensive survey studies in 
civil-military relations literature, that about 66 percent of mid-level military leaders 
identified themselves as conservatives whereas less than 5 percent of military 
respondents claimed to be liberals.  In comparison, among civilian leaders, 
conservatives and liberals were almost evenly divided.17  A similar pattern of the 
military’s strong self-identification with conservatism was found among the military 
                                                
15 PD Feaver and RH Kohn, "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians nd Their Mutual Misunderstanding," The 
National Interest 61(Fall 2000). 
16 JA Davis, "Attitudes and Opinions among Senior Military Officers and a US Cross-Section, 1998-
99," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. P Feaver 
and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2001). Bacevich and Kohn, "Grand Army of the 
Republicans - Has the US Military Become a Partisan Force." Jason Dempsey, Our Army: Soldiers, 
Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Peter 
M. Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009). 
17 Ole R. Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites 
at the Start of a New Millennium," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American 
National Security, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). 
7 
 
brass18 and military academy and ROTC cadets19, whereas the same tendency was 
not found among enlisted soldiers20.   
Holsti’s other study, in which surveys were conducted for military and 
civilian leaders every four years from 1976 to 1996, found that the percentage of 
conservatives in the military has increased.21  While 61 percent of military leaders 
identified themselves as conservatives in 1976, that number grew by 12 percent by 
1996, when 73 percent self-identified as conservative.  The decrease of liberals in the 
military was quite dramatic.  During the same research period liberals among 
military officers dropped from 16 to 3 percent.  Although the percent of liberal 
civilian leaders decreased during the period, the drop was not as dramatic as among 
military leaders.22  In 1996, civilian leaders were divided evenly between liberals 
and conservatives at 36 percent.   
Overall, the above-mentioned studies confirm the results of previous studies: 
the military’s ideological leaning toward conservatism.  Huntington—the dean of 
scholars of American civil-military relations—argued that the military is inherently 
                                                
18 Davis, "Attitudes and Opinions among Senior Military Officers and a US Cross-Section, 1998-99." 
19 VC Franke, "Generation X and the Military: A Comparison of Attitudes and Values between West 
Point Cadets and College Students," Journal of political and military sociology 29, no. 1 (2001); 
David E. Rohall, Morten G. Ender, and Michael D. Matthews, "The Effects of Military Affiliation, 
Gender, and Political Ideology on Attitudes toward the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq," Armed Forces 
& Society 33, no. 1 (2006). 
20 David R Segal et al., "Attitudes of Entry-Level Enlisted Personnel: Pro-Military and Politically 
Mainstreamed," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, 
ed. P Feaver and Richard H Kohn (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2001).  
21 Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 
1976-96," International Security 23, no. 3 (1998). 
22 Liberals among civilian leaders declined from 42 to 36 percent during the research period whereas 
conservatives went up from 30 to 36 percent. Ibid.: 13    
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conservative due to the functions it performs.23  The difference between proponents 
of gap thesis and Huntington, however, is that whereas the latter saw military’s 
conservatism as a necessity for military effectiveness, the former viewed it as, at 
least partly, responsible for the tensions between the military and civilians stated
earlier.  While Huntington argued that conservatism nature of the military needs to 
be preserved, scholars worrying about the ideological gap maintained that measures 
to reduce the gap are needed. 
Another important finding in the recent gap literature is the decline of 
military veterans in the U.S. political institutions.  Scholars found that the number of 
military veterans has significantly diminished since 1970s, the time period when the 
military changed the personnel acquisition policy from the draft to the All-Voluntary 
Force structure.24  While about 74 percent of the U.S. House of Representatives were 
military veterans in 1969, the equivalent figure in 1999 was 34.8 percent.  A similar 
dramatic decline of military veterans was also observed in the U.S. Senate.25 
Given the so-called “veteran effects” 26, the decreasing number of military 
veterans in political institutions was seen as a warning sign.  Scholars found that 
military veterans tend to be closer than non-veterans to active duty military 
personnel in terms of political and social preferences due to the socialization effect 
                                                
23 SP Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univers ty Press, 1957:2002). 
24 John T. Warner and Beth J. Asch, "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the 
United States," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2001). 
25 William T Bianco and Jamie  Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience 
in the U.S. Congress," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National 
Security, ed. Peter D Feaver and Richard H Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). 
26 JM Teigen, "Enduring Effects of the Uniform: Previous Military Experience and Voting Turnout," 
Political Research Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2006). 
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that military service leaves.  In this sense, Burk called veterans “cultural bearers” 
and considered them as a bridge between the military and society.27  Thus, the 
decline of military veterans was seen as meaning that the military had been losing its 
ties with the society.  Proponents of the gap thesis argued that the controversies in 
the 1990s were some of the symptoms of this estrangement of the military from 
society.  The less military veterans in different segments of society, including 
political institutions, the less societal understanding of military life, culture, and 
needs.  Under this condition, the preferences of the military and society would 
diverge, and tensions between the two would increase.  To the proponents of gap 
thesis, serious efforts to “bridge or at least narrow the chasm” seemed essential.28 
Not only did proponents of gap thesis attempt to explain tensions in the 
1990s as a result of growing civil-military gap, they also tried to examine how a gap 
influences military effectiveness.  The basic argument about the influence of th  
civil-military gap on military effectiveness was well expressed by Feaver, Kohn, and 
Cohn.  Raising concerns over the controversies in the 1990s, they speculated that “a 
gap in values or attitudes between people in uniform and civilian society may have 
become so wide that it threatens the effectiveness of the armed forces and civil-
military cooperation.”29  Using more general terms, the above assertion can be 
expressed as meaning that the size of the civil-military gap has an inverse 
                                                
27 J Burk, "Military Culture," Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict 2(1999). 
28 Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 1976-
96," 8. 
29 P Feaver, Richard H Kohn, and Lindsay Cohn, "The Gap between Military and Civilian in the 
United States in Perspective," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American 
National Security, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 1. 
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relationship with military effectiveness.  When the size of the gap is small, civilians 
and the military are expected to share a common understanding of what needs to be 
done to enhance military effectiveness.  When the magnitude of the gap is 
substantial, “the military and civilians hold sharply divergent opinions on what hurts 
military effectiveness and therefore, by implication, endorse sharply different 
policies for preserving the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.”30 
This points to the main analytical focus of this study.  I argue that supporters 
of gap thesis have not been successful in theorizing and assessing the relationship 
between civil-military gap and military effectiveness.  So far, only a handful of 
studies have been devoted to studying the implications of civil-military gap for 
military effectiveness, and those studies suffer from various problems such a  
ambiguous causal mechanism and omission of relevant variables.  Due to these 
weaknesses, it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions on whether or how 
civil-military gap affects military effectiveness.   
 A closer look at the analyses dealing with the relationship between civil-
military gap and military effectiveness easily reveals weaknesses in theory and 
methodology.  Fordham examined whether the decline of military veterans had an 
impact on defense spending in the United States.31  Fordham’s study, however, lacks 
a causal mechanism that connects military veterans and military spending.  He began 
                                                
30 P Gronke and PD Feaver, "Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes About Civil-
Military Relations," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National 
Security, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 151. 
31 Benjamin O. Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military 
"Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and 
American National Security, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 2001). 
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with an idea that given the findings that military veterans are more supportive f 
defense spending increase than non-veterans, the decline of veterans would be 
associated with a significant drop or fluctuations of the level of defense spending.  
This is a plausible hypothesis.  But, Fordham is not clear about causal mechanisms.  
Does the decrease of military veterans in the general public matter?  Alternatively, 
can the decreasing number of military veterans in Congress or defense-related 
committees explain variations of defense spending?  Nowhere in his study can I find 
serious efforts to specify causal mechanisms.   
In addition, Fordham did not control for other potential factors that are 
known to influence defense spending.  There is extensive literature on determinants 
of defense spending.  The factors range from external threat, macro-economic 
considerations, and political as well as ideological factors.32  With ambiguous causal 
mechanisms and omitted variables, Fordham’s study does not shed much light on the 
relationship between civil-military gap and defense spending.   
 The same problems are also found in other studies.  Szayna et al. examined 
the relationship between civil-military opinion gaps and military effectiveness.33  
They clearly recognized the theoretical connection between attitudes, political 
processes, and military effectiveness: 
                                                
32 AR Chowdhury, "A Causal Analysis of Defense Spending and Economic Growth," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 35, no. 1 (1991); Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard Stoll, "Representing 
Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (2003); CW Ostrom Jr and RF Marra, "US Defense Spending 
and the Soviet Estimate," The American Political Science Review 80, no. 3 (1986); Tsai-Tsu Su, Mark 
S. Kamlet, and David C. Mowery, "Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: A 
Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective," American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 1 (1993). 
33 T Szayna et al., The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter? 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007). 
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Military effectiveness is defined in terms of the military’s ability to carry 
out its missions. That ability is a product of the processes that determine the 
military’s critical aspects, such as its size, force structure, armament, 
manning, and training. While the behavior or attitudes of military personnel 
and civilians may differ in a variety of ways, our primary interest in this 
study is in those differences that may affect military effectiveness. The 
challenge, then, is to identify such attitudes and determine how t ey might 
affect policy. Thus, the interplay of attitudes and process—i.e., how
differences in attitudes affect the processes that determin  military 
effectiveness—is our focal point.34 
 
The study is laudable for the awareness of what constitutes military effectiveness 
(e.g. threat assessment and military budget), what specific procedures influ nce each 
constituting element of military effectiveness, and how civil-military gap is to 
influence the procedures and the outcomes.   
 The methodology they employed, however, makes it difficult to draw any 
meaningful conclusions.  First, even though Szayna et al. made a detailed analysis of 
the elements of military effectiveness, they did not specify the causal mechanism 
that links civil-military opinion gap and military effectiveness.  They did mention 
that “with regard to military effectiveness, the direct and most important 
consequences of a civil-military gap arise in conditions when major differences xist 
between military and civilian elites.”35 Yet, it is unclear who the military and civilian 
elites are.  Without specifying causal mechanisms, the results of Szayna et al. 
become less meaningful.   
 Second, the study by Szayna et al. does not employ any dependent variables 
that have a direct bearing on actual military effectiveness.  The dependent variables 
they employed are opinions on various elements of military effectiveness.  The main 
                                                
34 Ibid., 13. 
35 Ibid., 151. 
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analytical interest is whether civilians and military personnel differ in terms of the 
priorities they assign to national defense.  When there is little civil-military opinion 
gap in the priorities, they conclude that there is little concern over the gap.  This also 
means that when the opinion gap is substantial, it may harm military effectiveness.  
Is this really the case?  There is a possibility that the size of the civil-military opinion 
gap may not have any relationship with actual military effectiveness.  Szayna et al. 
did not address this possibility and drew erroneous conclusions about the 
implications of civil-military opinion gap.  In other words, the theoretical linkage 
between civil-military opinion gap and actual military effectiveness is never tested 
in their study.  Therefore, their study still leaves readers confused whether the 
opinion gap really matters in explaining the level of military effectiveness.  The 
same set of problems is also found in a study by Miller and Williams.36   
A notable exception is the study by Gelpi and Feaver.37  They applied the 
methodological rigor for establishing the causality between the civil-mlitary gap and 
use of force.  The main theoretical concern is the way the level of military 
experience, as measured by the percentage of military veterans in the U.S. House 
and Cabinet, influences foreign policy decisions concerning use of military force.  In 
so doing, the analysis makes the causal mechanism clear: the impact of miliary 
experience is to be exerted through the political institutions.  They found that the 
                                                
36 Laura L. Miller and John Allen Williams, "Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality 
Undermine Combat Effectiveness?," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American 
National Security, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). 
37 P Feaver and C Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of 
Force (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004). Also see C Gelpi and PD Feaver, 
"Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force," 
American Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (2002). 
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more military veterans in the House and Cabinet, the more likely it is that the 
contents of decisions related to use of force reflect the preference of the mili ary.  
Not only did they examine the influence of military experience on actual policy 
outcomes, but also they enhanced the validity of the results by controlling for other 
possible explanations of use of force.   
The lack of systematic evidence demonstrating negative implications of civil-
military gap is at the center of debates between proponents and critics of gap thesis. 
Critics are often called the “so what” school.38  They tend to agree with the existence 
of civil-military gap, but the two schools sharply differ in the implications of the gap.  
The central claim of critics is that the existence of the civil-military gap does not 
necessarily mean it has an adverse effect on decision making processes and public 
policy.  Pointing out there is little evidence that the growth of Republican Party 
affiliation in the military has led to political activism, Collins argued that “If we 
cannot correlate or otherwise connect the growth in the number of officers as 
moderately conservative or Republican with significant political activity or fractious 
differences on policy issues, we will have to redefine our terms or move the analysis 
of the ‘gap’ to another plane.”39  At the more fundamental level, Collins further 
emphasized that a key focus of civil-military gap thesis should be an examination of 
                                                
38 SC Sarkesian, "The US Military Must Find Its Voice," Orbis 42, no. 3 (1998); RM Cassidy, "The 
Salience of Military Culture," Military Review May-June(2005); JJ Collins, "The Complex Context of 
American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View," Washington Quarterly 21(1998); J Hillen, "Must 
US Military Culture Reform?," Orbis 43, no. 1 (1999). 
39 JJ Collins and OR Holsti, "Civil-Military Relations: How Wide Is the Gap?," International Security 
24, no. 2 (1999). 
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“whether any fact or trend … has ever had or will ever have a significant impact on 
public policy.”40 
A similar concern for the current status of gap thesis was also raised by other 
critics.  Hooker maintained that “[T]his tendency to draw broad conclusions from a 
specific case is prevalent in the field but highly questionable as a matter of 
scholarship.”41  In a similar vein, Snider argued against the contention that any gap 
between civilians and the military is problematic, and stressed that “[A] truly 
informed debate is called for—one concerned with effective policymaking and 
focused on … military capabilities and effectiveness.  The purposes of the military 
and its ability to fulfill those purposes should drive the debate.”42 
Critics of the gap thesis, however, are not immune from criticisms.  Even 
though they have been successful in pointing out weaknesses of gap thesis, critics 
have not made serious efforts to prove or disprove the theoretical connection 
between the civil-military gap and policy outcomes.  In this regard, Holsti is cr t cal 
of the way opponents of the gap thesis present their arguments:   
These incidents do not satisfy the criterion suggested by Colonel Collins 
because they cannot demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt a significant 
correlation between partisan preferences and behavior and they are not 
equally severe violations of professional norms. They do suggest, however, 
that those in the ‘so what’ school may not be wholly correct when they 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
41 RD Hooker Jr, "Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations," 
Parameters 33, no. 4 (2003): 9. 
42 DM Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," Orbis 43, no. 1 (1999): 25. A similar 
argument is made by Hillen. See J Hillen, "The Gap between American Society and Its Military: Keep 
It, Defend It, Manage It," Journal of National Security Law 4(2000). 
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dismiss as irrelevant any evidence of partisanship within the armed forcesby 
depicting an impermeable firewall between beliefs and actions.43 
 
Indeed, as much as the proponents of the gap thesis are vulnerable to criticism over 
the lack of systematic evidence concerning the relationship between civil-military 
gap and policy outcomes, critics are also susceptible to the same kind of criticism.   
 In sum, scholars in the subfield of civil-military relations have made stride 
in uncovering the nature and extent of civil-military gap.  It is safe to argue, however, 
that the current status of the gap thesis is in a state of collective ignorance over the 
implications of civil-military gap for military effectiveness and other public policy.  
This scholarly void needs to be filled.   
 
3. Research Questions 
To this point, I have reviewed studies in the gap literature and identified an 
area of scholarly debate.  The main source of the debate is the lack ofsystematic 
evidence that civil-military gap has an influence on military effectiveness and public 
policy.  As analyzed earlier, existing studies dealing with this relationship do not 
help us resolve this debate due to the theoretical and methodological weaknesses.  
Therefore, we still do not know the extent of the influence of civil-military gap.   
In order to address this research gap in the literature of gap thesis, this 
dissertation focuses on two aspects of civil-military gap: ideology and military 
experience gap.  What is the impact of ideology and military experience gap on 
                                                
43 OR Holsti, "Politicization of the United States Military-Crisis or Tempest in a Teapot," 
International Journal 57, no. Winter (2001-2002). 
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defense spending?  As will be shown in the following chapter, the military has a
strong preference for a higher level of defense spending due to its inherent 
conservative ideology and functions it performs.  Accepting the logic of proponents 
of gap thesis, this study hypothesizes that the magnitude of these civil-military gaps 
has a negative relationship with defense spending.  When the size of the gap is sm ll, 
it is expected that civilians and the military have a shared understanding about the 
measures to improve military effectiveness.  Under this condition, it is anticipated 
that civilians are likely to agree with military preference for defense spending.  This 
study expects that this will lead to increase in defense spending.  When the 
magnitude of the gap is large, decreases in defense spending will follow.   
This study limits the scope of analysis to the United States and covers the 
period between 1952 and 2000.  In doing so, this dissertation theorizes that 
ideological and military experience gap in political institutions matters in explaining 
the level of military spending.  Political institutions such as Congress and Cabinet 
possess the authority to allocate resources to national defense.  If the civil-military 
gap exerts any causal impact on defense spending, the most direct influence will be 
through political institutions.  By taking a set of control variables into consideration, 
this study addresses some of the weaknesses of existing studies dealing with civil-
military gap and military effectiveness.   
In examining the role that the ideology gap plays, this study treats the 
conservative ideology of the military as an analytical constant for the following two 
reasons.  First, it is difficult to obtain data that measure the ideology of the military 
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over an extended period.  The most desirable research strategy is to measure the 
ideological gap between political institutions and the military over time, and test if
this gap has actually influenced increase or decrease of defense spending with other 
possible factors controlled.  Although scholarly interests in the conservative natur
of the military have lasted over decades44, it is not until recently that analysts have 
begun to conduct extensive surveys to tap into this ideological gap between civilians 
and the military.45  Therefore, the scarcity of data imposes a constraint on direct 
measurement of military’s ideology.   
Second, studies have demonstrated that the officer corps is predominantly 
conservative, and this tendency has been more or less stable.  Even though 
Huntington’s notion of the officer corps as an ideologically monolithic entity has 
been challenged46, studies repeatedly confirmed the strong conservative nature of the 
officer corps.47  A recent dissertation found that while wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have caused a meaningful change in party affiliation among military officers, they 
                                                
44 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations; Morris 
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait , Free Press Paperback (New York: 
The Free Press, 1971); Jerald D. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, The All-Volunteer 
Force: A Study in Military Ideology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977). 
45 P Feaver and RH Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American 
National Security (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press,2001); Dempsey, Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, 
and American Civil-Military Relations; JM Teigen, "The Role of Previous Military Service in 
American Electoral Politics" (Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 2005); Holm, "Military 
Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq". 
46 For example, Dempsey found that female and Hispanic officers are much less likely to identify 
themselves as conservatives than white officers. Demps y, Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and 
American Civil-Military Relations. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations. 
47 Teigen, "The Role of Previous Military Service in American Electoral Politics"; Ricks, "On 
American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society "; Davis, "Attitudes 
and Opinions among Senior Military Officers and a US Cross-Section, 1998-99."; Holsti, "A 
Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 1976-96."; ———, 




have not brought about a concomitant adjustment in ideology, proving stability of 
ideology in the officer corps.48  Considering the limitation in data collection and the 
stability of ideology in the military, this study takes the ideology of the military as an 
analytical constant and measures the changes of ideology in political institutions as a 
proxy of ideological gap between civilians and the military.  According to this 
strategy, when conservatism in political institutions becomes stronger, it indicates 
that the ideological gap between civilians and the military decreases.  When 
liberalism intensifies, the gap increases.   
  As for the military experience gap, this dissertation follows Gelpi and 
Feaver’s conceptualization.49  The level of military experience, which is measured as 
the percentage of military veterans in political institutions, is treated s a proxy 
measurement of military experience gap.  A high percentage of military veterans in 
political institutions means a small military experience gap.  Under this siuation, 
political institutions are expected to have enhanced understanding of military needs.  
On the contrary, when there are a small number of military veterans, the military 
experience gap becomes large.   
Employing this approach, this study measures a relative—rather than 
absolute—gap between civilians and the military.  Figure 1 graphically expresses 
conceptualization of ideology and military experience gap.  The point B in the figur  
describes a situation where conservatism is strong and there are a large number of 
                                                
48 Heidi A. Urben, "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of 
Arms" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2010). 
49 Gelpi and Feaver, "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stck? Veterans in the Political Elite and the 
American Use of Force." 
 
military veterans in political institutions.  
(1) is small.  The point A illustrates the opposite situation




This study treats d
effectiveness.  According to Millet, Murray, and Watman, military 
four hierarchical dimensions: political, strategic, operational, and tactical 
effectiveness.50  In this framework, the volume and nature of defense spending is 
                                        
50 AR Millett, W Murray, and Kenneth N Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," in 
Military Effectiveness, ed. AR Millett and W Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988).
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element of the political dimension where common understanding between civilian 
and military elites is essential to ensure that the military is given a r gular share of 
national resources.  This study expects that the size of ideology and military 
experience gap influences the level of common understanding.  Given the 
competitive nature of resource allocation among government agencies, when there is
little common ground between civilian and military elites, the military would have a 
hard time to obtain sufficient military spending.  This study concentrates on one 
element of military effectiveness, and by only examining that particular aspect, it has 
a limited, but focused analytical purpose. 
This study contributes to the existing scholarship of gap thesis literature by 
establishing and testing institutional theories of the impacts of civil-military gap on 
defense spending.  By doing so, it sheds light on the question of whether the civil-
military gap really matters in explaining military effectiveness.   
 
4. Chapter Plan 
This study consists of the following five chapters.  In the second chapter, I 
review literature on ideology and military veterans.  As for ideology, I focus n 
analyzing Huntington’s theory of what role ideology plays in determining the level
of defense spending.  With regard to military veterans, I trace the origin of the
preference of military veterans on defense spending.  The main focus of this chapter
is on deducing testable hypotheses about the impact of ideology and military 
                                                                                                                                         
following study deals with tactical effectiveness. Miller and Williams, "Do Military Policies on 
Gender and Sexuality Undermine Combat Effectiveness?." 
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experience gap on defense spending.  In chapter 3, I operationalize and measure 
independent and dependent variables.  A set of control variables are also considered.  
In chapter 4, I show the results of multivariate regression analyses.  Interaction 
effects related to the variables of ideology and military experience are also examined.  




II. Literature Review 
 
 Why does the civil-military gap matter?  The logic behind the scholarly 
interest in the civil-military gap is the expectation that the extent of the difference in 
values, ideology, opinions, and perspectives between civilians and the military 
explains the parameters and outcomes of civil-military relations. When the civil-
military gap concerning a certain policy is small, it is conceptualized as meaning that 
there is a general consensus and common understanding between civilians and the 
military.  Under this condition, it is expected that civil-military relations is 
characterized by harmony, and the preferences of the military are accepted by 
civilians without major impediments.  In contrast, with a substantial civil-mil tary 
gap, the gap thesis predicts that there exists a lack of consensus and mutual 
understanding between the two groups.  Under this situation, it is anticipated that the 
relationship between civilians and the military will be marked by tensions, and 
military preferences will not be readily accepted by civilians in public policies.   
 Applying the logic stated above to the issue of military spending, we can 
expect that military preference on military spending will take precedenc when the 
value and preference gap between civilians and the military is small.  On the 
contrary, it is expected the opposite is true when the preference gap is considerable.  
Civilians, who have priorities different from that of the military, are likely to give 
less attention to military needs and impose their own preference on d fense spending.   
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 In this chapter, I lay out a theoretical framework for an assessment of the 
impact of the two kinds of civil-military gap, the ideological gap and the military 
experience gap, on defense spending.  The key purpose of this chapter is twofold.  
First, I identify what preferences variants of ideology and military experience 
generate.  Second, based on this identification, I draw hypotheses about how varying 
degrees of ideology and military experience gap impact defense spending.   
 This chapter consists of two parts.  In the first section, I draw on the literatur  
to comprehend the role of ideology as the source of preference on defense spending.  
In doing so, Huntington’s civil-military relations theory provides the main 
theoretical foundation; the empirical findings of other scholars that support or deny 
the validity of Huntington’s arguments are also assessed.  Based on the analysis, I 
deduce a hypothesis about the impact of the shift in ideology at the institutional level 
between liberalism and conservatism on the amount of defense spending.   
 In the second section, I draw together literatures on military socializat on, 
self-selection, and military culture to show how military experience giv s military 
veterans a set of preferences that are distinct from non-veterans.  The review 
ultimately leads to a hypothesis about the relationship between the prevalenc of 
military experience in political institutions and the level of military spending.   





1. The Ideology Gap and Defense Spending 
 A discussion about the ideology gap and its implication on defense spending 
should begin with the definition of ideology.  Scholars have defined ideology in 
many different ways.51  Converse defined ideology as belief systems that contain 
“ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of 
constraint or functional interdependence.”52  While Converse’s definition 
emphasizes the coherence as an essential element of ideology, Zaller puts an 
emphasis on the function of ideology in his definition when he labels ideology as “a 
mechanism by which ordinary citizens make contact with specialists who are 
knowledgeable on conversational issues and share the citizens’ predispositions.”53  
Huntington’s definition accentuates the problem-solving function of ideology: “A set 
of values and attitudes oriented about the problems of the state.”54  Employing the 
important elements from the definitions presented above, ideology in this study is 
defined as a coherent set of ideas and attitudes that help determine ways to solve
social and political problems and communicate among individuals and institutions.   
 Why does political ideology matter in civil-military relations?  The obvious 
answer to this question is that ideology matters because of its importance as a source 
                                                
51 J Gerring, "Ideology: A Definitional Analysis," Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (1997). 
52 PE Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. 
David E. Apter (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 207. 
53 J Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1992), 327. 
54Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 90. In 
his later work, Huntington defined an ideology with similar terms. He defined it as “a system of ideas 
concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a significant social 
group”. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," The American Political Science 
Review 51, no. 2 (1957): 454. 
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of political preference, attitudes, and policies.55  Then, we need to ask the following 
questions: What preference do variants of ideology generate in terms of the level of
military spending?   
 In civil-military relations literature, Huntington provides the most 
sophisticated theory that links political ideology and parameters of civil-military 
relations, including military spending.  The influence of Huntington’s theory has 
been so pervasive that Cohen asserted that Huntington “set the terms of debate about 
civil-military relations.”56  Even more than six decades after the publication of The 
Soldier and the State, many scholars still agree with the relevance of this book 
especially as they revisit Huntington for answers to impending problems in civil-
military relations in this era of war on terrorism and counterinsurgency.57   Indeed, 
Huntington’s theory that explains civil-military relations as a function of the 
ideology gap between society and the military still resonates.  Scholars argued that 
the individualistic liberal society is not tolerant of the conservative military, which 
enshrines masculinity and group-oriented mindsets.  Accordingly, the controversies 
                                                
55 In public opinion literature, scholars have found many other sources of political predispositions and
behaviors. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing demonstrated that genetic factors are important as a source of 
political attitudes. JR Alford, CL Funk, and JR Hibbing, "Are Political Orientations Genetically 
Transmitted?," American Political Science Review 99, no. 02 (2005). Kinder also noted such factors 
as personality, self-interest, group identification, values, and inferences from history are important in 
generating political orientations. DR Kinder, "Diversity and Complexity in American Public 
Opinion," Political science: The state of the discipline (1983).   
56 EA Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the 
Use of Force," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. 
P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 2001), 433.  Another research noted that 
“The Soldier and the State put the issue of civil-military relations on the map”. Robert D. Kaplan, 
"Looking the World in the Eye," Atlantic Monthly(December 2008).  
57 Suzanne C. Nielson and DM Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the 
State in a New Era (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press,2009). J Garofano, 
"Effective Advice in Decisions for War: Beyond Objective Control," Orbis 52, no. 2 (2008). 
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over homosexuals and extended combat roles for women are indicative of the 
ideological tensions.58  Scholars are also concerned with ideological strains in the 
context of the growing ideological polarization in the American political 
environment.  They worry that the military’s close affiliation with the Republican 
Party, based on the shared conservative ideology, may force the military to suffer 
budgetary and recruitment problems under Democratic control of the White House 
and Congress.59   
 Given the importance of Huntington’s theory in civil-military literature, it is 
no surprise that many scholars have assessed the validity of Huntington’s thery in 
various ways.  Several scholars have produced evidence that invalidate Huntington’s 
analysis on such concepts as military professionalism and objective civilian 
control.60  Huntington’s theory regarding the relationship between civilians and the 
                                                
58 Hillen, "Must US Military Culture Reform?." 
59 Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the 
Start of a New Millennium." 
60 Finer criticizes Huntington’s argument that military professionalism leads to voluntary 
subordination by demonstrating that the professionalized military may involve domestic politics to 
impose its influence because of the professional norms such as patriotism. See, S. E. Finer, The Man 
on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962). Welch shows that 
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CE Welch, Civilian Control of the Military (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976). 
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B Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 
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development in technology, weapons systems (e.g. nuclear weapons), and societal changes, military 
autonomy is not tenable and can pose dangers for nati nal defense. Based on the analysis, he suggests 
the notion of “constabulary” military, which is “continuously prepared to act, committed to the 
minimum use of force, and seeks viable international rel tions, rather than victory.” Janowitz, The 
Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrai , 418. Other scholars have critiqued Huntington 
over whether the division of labor between civilians and the military can generates strategic successes. 
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military (ideological gap), and its connection with military spending, however, has 
not been not explicitly examined in civil-military relations literature.  As will be 
discussed later, Feaver—who is one of the most influential critics of Huntington—
did attempt to examine Huntington’s theory and concluded that “Huntington’s theory 
does not adequately capture American civil-military relations.  Another theo y is 
needed.”61  His assessment of Huntington’s theory, however, was not complete.  
This dissertation tries to fill this void. 
 In this section, I first analyze Huntington’s theory about the relationship 
between ideology and military spending.  After that, I evaluate Feaver’s criticism of 
Huntington’s theory.  Finally, this section ends with a hypothesis to be tested in the 
following chapters.   
 
A. Huntington’s Theory of the Ideology Gap on Military Spending 
  
 Huntington’s key concern in The Soldier and the State was what he saw as 
the crisis of American civil-military relations in the wake of World War II.  The 
crisis concerned the clash between two factors generating opposite prefernc s—
functional and societal imperatives—on civil-military relations and its implication 
for national security.  On the one hand, the functional imperative, originated by the 
enormity of external threats, required that the United States build an effective and 
sizable military establishment.  On the other hand, the dominant liberalism in 
                                                                                                                                         
This leads Cohn to argue for “unequal dialogues” characterized by active involvement and probe of 
civilians into military matters including strategy. EA Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, 
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America had been reluctant to possess a sizeable military, due to the inherent 
tensions with military conservatism.  Although the military was at times provided 
with substantial amount of resources for defense against outside threats, as soon
threats lessened, America liberalism reduced the size of the military.  Fu ther, 
American liberalism attempted to civilize the military, causing the institution to lose 
its distinctive military mindset and to become an entity that reflected societal liberal 
values.  This liberal approach to civil-military relations, which worked before the 
Cold War, would undermine the security of the United States during the Cold War 
era where the “rivalry between the United States and the Soviet states app ared a 
relatively permanent aspect of the international scene.”62  While the Cold War 
demanded a long term commitment to national defense, American liberalism, as the 
dominant societal ideological philosophy, was not meant to support a large military.  
This is the central concern that motivated Huntington.  
 Huntington argued that the tension generated by the coexistence of 
heightened external threat and liberalism could only be solved by a significant 
change in one of the two imperatives:  “The tension between the demands of military 
security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only 
by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism.”63  Because 
Huntington saw the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
Union as a more or less constant feature of international politics, he was left with 
only one option: shift American ideology from liberalism to conservatism.  By 
                                                




departing from liberalism—which he considered “the gravest domestic threat to 
American military security”64 in the Cold War era—and embracing conservatism, 
Huntington anticipated the United States would create “a new, more sympathetically 
conservative environment for military institutions.”65  Most importantly, under this 
condition, in Huntington’s reasoning, the ideological affinity between the 
conservative society and the military would allow the military establishment to 
receive sufficient resources and develop into an apolitical and effective organizatio .  
 Summarizing the nature and solution of what Huntington saw as the crisis in 
America and American civil-military relations, this study identifies two determinants 
of military spending in Huntington’s theory: external threats and societal ideology.66  
As we will see shortly, the impact of external threats on defense spending is rather 
straightforward: The level of military resources is a function of the lev l of external 
threat.  What is more important for this study is the role that societal id ology plays 
on military capabilities when the effect of outside threats is controlled for.  
According to Huntington’s analysis, when liberalism was the dominant societal 
ideology, the United States tended to minimize the scale of military force.  This is 
the concern that Huntington posed.  Thus, Huntington argued that shift in societal 
                                                
64 Ibid., 457. 
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66 Huntington emphasizes the importance of these two variables for their influence on civil-military 
relations. He argued “[T]he military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional 
imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from 
the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which 
reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the 
other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by 
functional imperatives. This interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military 
relations. The degree to which they conflict depends upon the intensity of the security needs and the 
nature and strength of the value pattern of society.” Ibid., 2. 
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ideology from liberalism to conservatism would ensure sufficient military c pability 
to ensure national security in the post-World War II era.   
 Huntington’s first independent variable is functional imperative or “the 
threats to the society’s security.”67  The logic is simple.  The intensity of external 
threats determines the level of military preparedness a society needs to cope with the 
threats.  In the presence of compelling external threats, society would empowr the 
military by allotting resources for military preparedness in terms of personnel and 
military budget.  The scale of the military could drastically increase as America saw 
during the first and second World Wars.  Importantly, Huntington observed that 
American society would reduce the size of the military after the major threats 
receded.  This pattern was largely consistent with the expectation about the impact of 
external threat on the variation of military capability, including the military budget.  
Table 1 shows the changes in military expenditure and personnel in the first half of 








Table 1. U.S. Military Capability (1901-1957) 
Year 1901 1919 1923 1936 1945 1948 1957 
Military expenditure 
(million dollars) 
36 11,218 678 932 90,000 10,961 44,548 
Military personnel 
(thousands) 
112 2,897 247 291 12,123 1,446 2,796 
Source: National Material Capabilities (v.3.02) in the Correlates of War dataset (2005).  The 
military expenditure figures are calculated in current year U.S. dollars.  
 
 
 As Table 1 indicates, until the aftermath of World War II, there was a pattern 
in allocation of resources for national defense.  During the two World Wars, the 
military was given a substantial amount of resources.  But, when the threats were 
gone, the United States substantially reduced the level of military preparedness.  In 
1957, when Huntington published his book, the level of military expenditure and 
personnel was not as high as it was during the two World Wars, but it still remained 
substantial.  This unusual level of military spending, even after a major war ended, 
reflected the reality that the U.S. was facing during the Cold War.  On the one hand, 
U.S. interests now stretched to a global level.  On the other hand, potential threats 
from the Soviet Union were seen as enormous concerns to the security of the United 
States and its allies.  
 Huntington’s second variable is societal ideology, which is part of what he 
termed a societal imperative.  The other constituting part of societal imperative is the 
Constitution characterized by separation of power.  Wary of the danger of 
concentrated political power and unified control over the military, the Founding 
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Fathers came to an agreement to enact a conservative Constitution.  Under the 
Constitution, Congress and the president possess different authorities and 
responsibilities over the military.  For instance, the Constitution grants Congress the 
authority “to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy,” whereas 
the president assumes the role of Commander in Chief.68  As Huntington 
acknowledged, the Constitution makes civilian control difficult because it 
encourages the military to seek various venues for access to the policy making 
process.69  Importantly, the Constitution is an analytical constant in Huntington’s 
theory.70  Thus, societal ideology bears much of the explanatory responsibility on the 
variations of military spending along with a functional imperative derived from 
external threats.   
 Again, Huntington defines political ideology as “a set of values and attitudes 
oriented about the problems of the state.”71  Among the four types of ideological 
variants—liberalism, conservatism, Fascism, and Marxism—Huntington argued 
                                                
68 Ibid., 427.  
69 Ibid., 163-70. Also see pages 177-178, 400-403, and 427. Studies by subsequent scholars confirm 
the nature and consequence of the U.S. political system that divides the responsibility over the 
military into the hands of Congress and presidents. For example, Avant argues that this divided 
control over the military was the cause of the bias and rigidity in military strategy and doctrine during 
the Vietnam War, which led to a military failure. In the author’s analysis, Congress and the president 
before and during the Vietnam War could not have a shared understanding and view toward the 
nature of the war that the U.S. army was conducting. As a consequence, the U.S. army continued to 
apply a conventional military doctrine that was designed for regular warfare, to the guerilla warfare. 
DD Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," 
International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1993): 409-30. Also see ———, Political Institutions and 
Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ Pr, 1994); Deborah D. 
Avant, "Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness: Comtemporary United States and United 
Kingdom," in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A Brooks and 
Elizabeth A Stanley (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
70 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, ch. 7. 
71 Ibid., 90. In his later work, Huntington defined an ideology with similar terms. He defined it as “a 
system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a 
significant social group”. See ———, "Conservatism as an Ideology," 454. 
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liberalism had been the dominant political thought in the United States, so much so 
that he called it “ideological constant.”72  Huntington saw American liberalism as 
holding a few characteristics such as individualism, commercialism, and, hostility to 
the military and its values.  
First, Huntington noted that liberal political ideology emphasizes 
individualism, which he regarded as the “heart of the liberalism.”73  Liberalism is 
based on the ideal that “success in any enterprise depends upon the maximum release 
of individual energies.”74  It rejects organizational constraints on individual rights 
such as freedom of speech, and believes that conflicts in interests among states could 
be resolved through education and the establishment of appropriate social and 
political institutions.  Last but not least, Huntington noted that liberalism fosters 
progress and is inherently optimistic.   
Second, Huntington saw that liberalism upholds commercialism.  The 
ideology supports progress through economic growth.75  National resources should 
be used to advocate and promote economic development.  Thus, preparation for war 
is wasteful and to be avoided: “War itself was actively destructive of economic 
wealth.”76   
Last, and perhaps most importantly, Huntington noted that liberalism is 
hostile to military institutions.  Liberal values and perspectives are stkly different 
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73 Ibid., 90. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 267-68.  
76 Ibid., 222.  
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from what Huntington termed military conservatism, which will be discussed shortly.  
For liberals, the military equates to a group of people who try to justify the ra ionale 
for their existence, a tendency which puts society into danger: the military is “a 
warmonger” or “a sinister drag upon the conduct of war.”77  In addition, maintaining 
a standing army is considered undermining individual freedom and increasing the 
danger of dictatorship by facilitating concentration of power.   
Huntington maintained that these characteristics of liberal ideology are very 
different from the ideology that the military defends, the so-called military ethic or 
conservatism realism.  This ideology derives from the function that the military 
performs—“the management of violence.”78  The military ideology “consists of the 
values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the 
professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that 
function.”79   
According to Huntington, the military conservative realism has several 
distinct features.  First, it is characterized by pessimism.  Human beings are selfish, 
as are states, and this makes the military constantly alert to external threats.  The 
existence of military force itself indicates the constant possibility that conflicting 
interests would not be resolved in a peaceful way: “The man of the military ethic is 
essentially the man of Hobbes.”80  The military man is skeptical of maintaining 
peace through economic and legal measures.  He stresses that military force is the 
                                                
77 Ibid., 153. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 61. 
80 Ibid., 63. 
36 
 
last resort that states can rely on.  Thus, he demands “the enlarging and 
strengthening of the military forces available to protect the security of the state” and 
“a larger share of the national budget.”81     
Secondly, the military conservative realism prefers groups over individuals. 
In other words, it opposes individualism, one of the key attributes of liberalism.  
Military activities occur at the group level: “Success in any activity requires the 
subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group.”82  Individuals 
sacrifice themselves when they are required to do so for the accomplishment of 
group missions.  The wisdom of individuals gives way to the experience of th group.  
Initiatives of individuals are limited and are only allowed under constraints.  As 
some scholars have found, this tendency is what makes it difficult for the military to 
innovate.83   
In sum, Huntington concluded that based on his theory of the ideological 
tensions between liberalism and military conservatism, the military would have
difficulties ensuring resources for national defense under strong societal lib r ism.  
                                                
81 Ibid., 67. Bacevich’s notion of military professionalism also shows the uniqueness of the military 
ethic: “Traditional military professionalism—rooted in the ideal of the warrior as the embodiment of 
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short, orthodox notions of what is meant to be a soldier clash head-on with the imperatives of political 
correctness.” AJ Bacevich and RH Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans: Has the US Military 
Become a Partisan Force?," The New Republic 217, no. 23 (1997): 16.    
82 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 63. 
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Given the seemingly irreconcilable ideology gap between liberalism and military 
conservatism, it would be difficult for the military to persuade liberal-minded society 
to allocate enough resources for national defense.  The liberal society would view 
the military with suspicion and try to keep the military small, which would 
undermine national security.   
Based on this theory, as long as the external threat variable remained high, 
the only logical prescription for national security was for the American society to 
embrace conservatism.  Huntington believed that conservatism was sympathetic and 
compatible with military conservative realism, sharing fundamental assumptions 
with military ideology: “In its theories of man, society, and history, its recognition of 
the role of power in human relations, its acceptance of existing institutions, its 
limited goals, and its distrust of grand designs, conservatism … is at one with the 
military ethic.”84  Under conservatism, considering its ideological proximity to the 
military conservative realism, it was expected that the U.S. military would be able to 
maintain a substantial enough size to deter external threats. 
 
B. An Unsolved Question about the Relationship between Ideology and 
Military Spending 
 This dissertation has so far followed the causal mechanism of Huntington’s 
theory that connects societal ideology, the ideology gap between society and the 
military, and its impact on military spending.  This causal linkage was never t st d 
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in Huntington’s book.  What he pursued in The Soldier and the State, was an historic 
analysis of how the two independent variables, functional and societal imperatives, 
influenced the nature and features of civil-military relations until 1957.  Based on his
observation, he prescribed a solution to what he saw as the crisis in the United States 
by arguing for an ideological change of the society from liberal to conservatism. 
 In a subsequent study in 1977, Huntington made a comment on the changes 
in ideology since 1957.  He argued that an ideological shift actually occurred: “[T]he
argument advanced in the The Soldier and the State in 1957 was that, given the 
existing international situation, ‘the requisite for military security’ was a shift from 
liberalism to a ‘sympathetic conservative’ attitude toward the needs of military 
professionalism. To a surprising extent, that shift occurred.”85  He further argued that 
the ideological shift toward conservatism was beginning to reverse when he wrote 
that “in some measure, also, it has not been reversed. … The dilemma that was 
partially resolved in the 1950s has returned.”86 
 Huntington’s analysis of an ideological shift and its influence on military 
spending, however, was not complete, inviting a harsh criticism from Feaver.87  I 
argue that neither Huntington nor Feaver put the relationship between ideology and 
military spending into a rigorous empirical analysis, leaving readers to still wonder 
                                                
85 S Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in Civil-Military Relations  ed. Andrew J. 
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86 Ibid., 26. 
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about the validity of Huntington’s theory.  There are two problems with their 
arguments.   
 First, the dependent variables that Huntington and Feaver used in their 
analyses are not measured appropriately.  A large gap between the values of the 
indicators for the dependent variable and the actual numbers in military spending 
questions the strength of their arguments.  In Huntington’s 1977 study, the 
dependent variable—military spending—has a big margin of error.  Huntington 
argued that a shift in ideology toward conservatism occurred.  One indicator of this
ideological change is changes in public opinion: “[F]rom the late 1940s until the 
mid-1960s, opinion surveys showed the mass public overwhelmingly opposed to 
reductions in U.S. military forces and budgets and a significant portion of thepublic 
in favor of increases in military strength.”88  If public opinion on the level of military 
spending is a reliable indicator of an ideological shift, then there should be a 
connection to military spending: Military spending should remain high or it should 
have a stable pattern during the period.    
 The real changes in defense spending are seen in Figure 1 and 2.  Figure 1 
shows the level of defense burden, which measures the ratio of military expenditure 
to GDP.  Figure 2 indicates the changes in military expenditure.  These are some of 
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 From the figures, it is difficult to find any stable trend between the late 1940s 
and the mid-1960s.  After the Korean War ended in 1953, the defense burden 
substantially declined.  Military expenditure from the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s 
were relatively stable until the United States became actively engag d in the 
Vietnam War.  Huntington seems to be correct, however, in that the defense burden 
and military expenditure were declining around 1977.  This does not mean that 
Huntington’s theory was proven.  Huntington should provide that an ideological shift 
between conservatism and liberalism has an independent impact on defense spending, 
when external threats are controlled.  Indeed, Huntington acknowledged the 
importance of external threat in explaining increases or decreases in defense 
spending when he argued that “In the absence of a major international crisis, a return 
to anything resembling the cold war pattern of civil-military relations seems very 
unlikely.”89  Nowhere in Huntington’s analysis is there a conscious effort to separate 
the impact of external threat from that of ideology. 
 In his criticism, Feaver made a significant mistake in terms of analyzi g the 
dependent variable, military spending. Feaver wrongly understood public support for 
defense spending, instead of actual figures of military spending, as the dependent 
variable of Huntington’s 1977 article.  This mistake comes as much from the lack of 
a serious discussion of military spending in Huntington’s article as from Feaver’s 
own misunderstanding.  Feaver maintained that “[O]f greater concern, his evidence 
consisted largely of output measures, but his theory was a claim about input 
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measures; the output was support for building sufficient armed forces, the input was 
the sway of liberalism in society.”90  This interpretation of Huntington’s theory is 
wrong, as Huntington had considered public support for military spending as one of 
many indicators of ideology.  The problem with Huntington was that he discussed 
many input measures—which contain contradicting values as Feaver shows—
without discussing the output measure, military spending, in detail.   
 With this mistake, Feaver spent much of the analysis discussing the 
relationship between “support for the military as an institution” and “support for a 
large military establishment or support for a still larger military establishment in the 
form of defense budget increases.”91  The analysis led Feaver to conclude 
Huntington’s theory is flawed because of the mismatch between the two variables.  
The reasoning for analyzing the two variables comes from Feaver’s criticism that 
“Huntington must measure a change in ideology independent of the military 
buildup.”92  Even when we accept that the former—public support for the military as 
an institution—rightly captures the ideological change, a question still remains.  Is 
the latter variable adequate for the military buildup?  As the studies by Hartley and 
Russett 93, Wlezien94, and Bartels 95 indicate, public opinion is an important 
determinant of defense spending.  This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
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public support for military spending can be a useful indicator of ideology.  Thus, the 
answer to the question above is no, which shows Feaver’s analysis and criticism of 
Huntington’s theory did not live up to expectations.  
 Feaver also examined military spending, but his treatment of this variable 
was flawed.  Feaver started by revisiting Huntington’s main fear about the Cold War 
civil-military relations: “Huntington’s real concern was whether a liberal society 
would support enough defense spending to prevail in the Cold War. Clearly, in 
retrospect, it did.”96  It is, however, not clear what he meant by ‘enough’ defense 
spending.  According to his argument, there are only two values in the variable of 
defense spending: enough or not enough military spending.  This treatment is too 
simplistic in terms of measurement, which is quite different from reality.  As Figure 
2 and 3 suggest, defense spending during the Cold War varied substantially.  
Without mentioning this, Feaver reasoned that because the United States supported 
‘enough’ military spending, this should be preceded by a shift in ideology from 
liberalism to conservatism.  Although Feaver discussed evidence that liberalism with 
regard to individualism, antistatism, and tolerance was quite strong during most of 
the Cold War era97—which suggests that Huntington’s theory is not empirically 
tenable—his flawed reasoning makes it difficult for him to make a decisive 
conclusion.   
 The second problem is that Huntington and Feaver employ many indicators 
of the independent variable—ideology—that do not covary with each other.  In part, 
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this is inevitable given the complexity of defining and measuring ideology.98  What 
makes things more complicated for Huntington is the scope of his study.  The fact 
that he attempted to explain the role that ideology (and ideological shift) plays on 
civil-military relations unavoidably broadens the definition of ideology, resulting in 
adoption of many indicators.  Related to this are various units of analysis at different 
analytical levels.  In his 1977 article, Huntington presented at least three indicators 
of ideology: Antimilitarism, support for the military forces, and support for defense 
spending increases.  The unit of analysis includes legislators, the intellectual 
community, the attentive public, and the mass public.  Notwithstanding the fuzziness 
in measuring some variables, this complexity makes Huntington’s analysis 
susceptible to criticism.   
 Feaver’s analysis of Huntington clearly shows the problem.  Employing a 
study by Segal and Blair99, Feaver pointed out that whereas support for and 
confidence in the military as an institution remained high from the 1960s until the 
mid-1970s, public support for increases in defense spending dropped from over 80 
percent during the 1950s and 60s to less than 50 percent in 1969.  This shows that at 
least one of the two variables is not a reliable indicator of ideology.  The results of 
King and Karabell’s study further questioned whether confidence in the military s a 
good indicator of ideology.100  Examining the changes in public confidence in the 
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military, they found that although ideology is an influential factor, other variables 
such as religiosity, the amount of time respondents spent watching TV, marriage 
status, and gender are also strong indicators of confidence in the military.  The 
results also showed that ideological extremists, strong conservatives and liberals
alike, were less likely to be confident in the military.  This suggests that adop ing 
confidence in the military as an indicator of ideology is questionable.    
 In sum, Huntington’s own assessment of his theory and Feaver’s criticism of 
Huntington did not systematically examine the influence of ideology, and the 
ideology gap between civilians and the military on military spending.  They 
employed crude bivariate analyses between various indicators of ideology and the 
dependent variable—military spending—which they wrongly measured.  Equally 
important, they failed to control for other alternative explanations of military 
spending including external threat.  This void should be filled with a carefully 
designed empirical study.  
 
C. Research Hypothesis 
 The theoretical link between ideology and opinion on defense spending and 
related policy issues at the individual level has been well established.101  
Huntington’s main concern, however, is the role of societal ideology on defense 
spending.  As I demonstrated, neither Huntington nor his critics examined this 
relationship in a systematic way.  This study attempts to test that empirical question.    
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Testing Huntington’s theory requires several choices.  First, one needs to decide th  
unit of analysis.  As reviewed earlier, Huntington and Feaver attempted to look at the 
manifestations of ideological changes at various analytical levels.  An advisable w y 
is to base this decision on Huntington’s theory.  Which unit of analysis did 
Huntington think more important?   Second, a related question is to decide how to 
operationalize the independent variable, ideology.  This is important because 
ideology can be defined and measured in many different ways.  As I showed earlier,
the analyses by Huntington and Feaver display the complexity of this issue.  
 With regard to the unit of analysis, I choose to focus on Congress.  
Huntington conceptualizes the state as an element of the society in his book of 1957.  
According to his theory, political institutions are the primary mechanisms through 
which the influence of ideology on civil-military relations is exerted:   
  
The principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer 
corps to the state: Here the conflict between functional and societal 
pressures comes to a head. The officer corps is the active directing element 
of the military structure and is responsible for the military security of 
society. The state is the active directing element of society and is 
responsible for the allocation of resources among important values including 
military security. The social and economic relations between th military 
and the rest of society normally reflect the political relations between the 
officer corps and the state. 
 
 In his 1977 article, Huntington reemphasized that the political leadership 
should be the most important locus of analyses: “[T]he central problem of civil-
military relations thus becomes the relationship between military professi nal  and 
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the political leadership.”102  The selection of Congress as the analytical focus of this 
dissertation is further justified by studies analyzing and demonstrati g the 
importance of Congress in politics of defense resource allocation.103  It is also 
important to note that political institutions such as Congress have played a pivotal
role in shaping the political environment in which average citizens understand and 
communicate in ideological terms.  As Jackman and Sniderman state, “it is not 
possible to give an account of how people solve problems without considering the 
role of political institutions in organizing the choice space.”104 
The analytical focus on Congress as an institution differs from previous 
research emphasizing the role that ideology plays at the individual level.  Indeed, th  
importance of ideology as a source of policy preferences on defense and security 
issues has been recognized as conventional wisdom.  A particularly productive area 
of research concerns the impact of ideology in shaping policy preferences on 
congressional voting.  Scholars have found that the more conservative the legislators 
are, the more likely they vote to support defense and security programs.  The causal 
connection between ideology and roll-call votes have been found in the votes on 
strategic defense initiative105, strategic weapons systems106, decisions on foreign 
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intervention107, defense budgeting108, and the more general foreign policy 
decisions109.  In the light of these findings at the individual level, the results of this 
dissertation will shed light on the causal influence of ideology at the institutional 
level.   
 In terms of the operationalization of the concept, ideology, I identify two 
alternatives.  First, one can narrowly define the concept and focus on specific 
elements of ideology.  As Feaver did in his critique, individualism or antimilitarism 
can be some of the possible measurements for ideology.  Second, one can broadly 
define ideology and measure accordingly.  Measurement of ideology based on 
overall roll-call votes—a conceptualization of ideology in explicitly spatial terms—
is one example.  I prefer the second alternative for the following reasons.  
 The first reason I prefer the second concept of ideology is because of its wide 
use in political science.  According to Knight, “the simple idea that units of analysis 
can be arrayed on a left-right continuum” has been the dominant way of 
conceptualizing ideology since 1970s.110  This indicates that the results of this 
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dissertation can be understood in terms that many scholars use.  Second, Huntington 
had a broad concept of ideology in his book.  Feaver correctly pointed out “the 
seamless of Huntington’s view of the domestic and foreign components of 
liberalism.”111  Focus on specific elements of liberalism may not adequately capture 
this overarching concept of ideology.  In addition, the fact that a liberal-conservative 
continuum is the most widely used among the gap thesis scholars also supports my 
selection of this general concept of ideology.112   
 Last, the conceptualization and measurement of the ideology gap needs to be 
discussed.  Huntington’s theory assumes that the military’s conservatism is a 
constant.  Huntington viewed the conservatism as a defining factor for the military, 
the officer corps in particular.113  Scholars of gap thesis have found that 
Huntington’s analytical assumption is not tenable in the light of the empirical 
findings of ideological diversity and changes in the military.114  However, there 
seems to be a common ground between Huntington and gap thesis scholars: The 
ideology of the officer corps show a strong conservatism.  Indeed, studies show that 
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this tendency has been more or less stable over time.115  Adding together 
Huntington’s emphasis on the officer corps as the backbone of the military with the 
findings of the gap thesis studies showing the stability of conservatism among 
military officers over time into account means this study treats military conservatism 
as an analytical constant.  There is one more reason for this treatment.  Although 
scholarly interests in the ideology gap date back several decades116, it i  difficult to 
obtain data adequate for a long-term study.        
 As a consequence, this study conceptualizes the ideology gap as a relative, 
instead of absolute, distance in ideology between Congress and military 
conservatism.  As the ideology in Congress moves toward conservatism, the 
ideology gap between Congress and the military decreases.  When liberalism 
intensifies in Congress, the opposite is true: The ideology gap increases.   
 The discussions about ideology as a source of political preference on defense 
spending, adequate units of analysis, and conceptualization and measurement of 
ideology and the ideology gap can be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: With external threat controlled the shift of ideology toward 
conservatism in Congress results in increase of defense spending  
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An empirical examination of this claim fills a void in the literature of the 
determinants of military spending.  The study of military spending has a long 
tradition.  Interestingly, ideology has not been taken seriously as a major theoretical 
consideration in the literature.  For an understandable reason, the realist, rational-
actor models, which have been the most important pillar in the research tradition, 
conceive military spending as a response to the changes in external threats defined as 
potential enemies’ conflict behavior, material capabilities117, alliance politics118, and 
wars.  Along with this realist perspective, scholars have understood military 
spending as a function of domestic political and economic conditions.  The regime 
types, electoral cycles, and macroeconomic conditions (such as recession and budget 
deficit) are some of the factors known to have a significant relationship with defense 
spending.119  
 Ideology has been considered in the literature on the determinants of military 
spending in two ways.  First, some studies examined the impact of the partisan 
control of the executive branch on defense spending.120  Second, others were 
interested in the role of ideological changes in Congress in explaining variations of 
military spending.  Eichenberg and Stoll tested if the percentage of legislative seats 
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occupied by the conservative parties relates to defense outlays in five industrialized 
countries including the United States.121  Except for the Great Britain, the results 
show no evidence to support the thesis.  A similar treatment of ideology and finding 
about the relationship between ideology in Congress and defense outlays is also 
found in the study by Su, Kamlet, and Mowery.122  Even though this dissertation 
shares with Eichenberg and Stoll the same theoretical interest in the role that 
ideology in Congress plays on defense spending, it uses a different concept and 
measurement of ideology.  As explained earlier, I assume testing Huntingto ’s 
theory requires the examination of central ideological tendency of Congress ac o
time.  This approach can thus capture the existence of conservative Democrats (e.g. 
Southern Democrats) that Eichenberg and Stoll did not take into consideration.123  In 
sum, an explicit test of Huntington’s theory will not only benefit the scholarship of 
civil-military relations, but will also broaden our understanding of the factors that 
determine the level of military spending in general.  
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2. Military Experience Gap and Defense Spending 
 Does military experience shape the views and perspectives of domestic and 
international policies?  If so, how do the political attitudes and values of people with 
military experience differ from those of others without military exposure?  What are 
the policy implications of the changes in the number of military veterans in society?  
These questions are not new124, but interest in this topic has been renewed by the 
controversies concerning use of force, military personnel policies, and other policy-
related issues in the Clinton administration and afterwards.   
Some scholars likened the controversies over the foreign policies (e.g. 
Kosovo) to the conflicts between “chicken hawks” and “military doves.”125   
Civilians with little understanding of the military urge the use of force ev n in cases 
where military means are ineffective.  On the contrary, the military is cautious about 
use of force, arguing that military force needs to be used selectively givn its 
limitations.126  The debate between Madeleine Albright, then ambassador to the UN, 
and Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the use of force 
during the Clinton administration seems to penetrate this line of conflict.  Powell 
wrote in his book, My American Journey,   
The debate [over intervention in Bosnia in 1993] exploded at one session when 
Madeleine Albright, our ambassador to the UN, asked me in frustration, “What’s the 
point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use 
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it?” I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be 
moved around on some sort of global game board.127    
 
One explanation that addresses these kinds of policy disagreements between 
civilians and the military focuses on military service as a source of policy 
preferences.  Military experience, it is posited, leaves its former and current 
members with a better understanding and knowledge of military affairs.  The logical 
conclusion from this perspective is that civilians who have not served the military 
have a set of political preferences that are likely different from those shared by 
military personnel and military veterans.    
If military experience colors policy preference, the shrinking number of 
military veterans in the United States should be taken seriously.128  The decline of 
military veterans may indicate the increasing divergence between society and the 
military in terms of understanding and appreciation of military matters, including the 
necessity and limitations of the military. The military establishment may find it 
difficult to persuade a militarily ignorant society that national defense should be a 
high priority.  The decline of military veterans in political institutions is even more 
important, as political institutions with direct authority and responsibility for military 
policies may have a markedly different distributional priority from the military’s 
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priorities.  If political institutions have little sympathy and appreciation of military 
matters, a decline in military spending is likely.  The voice of the military ma fail to 
be included in policy-making process, given this cycle of mutual 
misunderstanding.129   
To address this possibility of the reciprocal connection between the extent of 
military experience in society and defense spending, this section examines theories 
and empirical findings regarding the impact of military experience on the political 
preference related to defense spending.   
 
A. Decline in the Presence of Military Veterans 
A recent trend that concerns scholars in civil-military relations is that the 
number of military veterans in the U.S. political institutions has declined over 
time.130   Figure 4 shows this trend.  The percentage of military veterans in the U.S. 
House of Representatives increased during the first half of the twentieth century.  
From the lowest point at 12.6 percent in 1913, the proportion increased significantly 
to the position where the House had about 58 percent of military veterans in 1953.  
This large percentage increase was primarily due to the two World Wars and the 
Korean War.  Immediately after World War II, the percentage arrived at about 41 
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and at the end of the Korean War, about 48 percent of House of Representatives 
were military veterans.    
In the latter half of the century, congressional military veterans dropped 
sharply after the zenith in 1969 at 73.8 percent.  President Richard Nixon’s campaign 
promise to end the draft was realized during his second term when the U.S. military 
shifted its personnel system from conscription to the All-Voluntary Force syst m in 
July 1973.131  Under this new personnel acquisition system, the decline of military 
veterans has been significant since then.  The equivalent figure in 1999 was 34.8 
percent.  The presence of military veterans in the U.S. Senate has followed a similar 
pattern.132 
Bianco and Markham’s study shows another interesting trend in the decline 
of military veterans: military veterans have been overrepresented for most of the last 
century.133  According to the authors, the percentage of military veterans in the U.S. 
Congress was much higher compared to that in the public, which indicated potential 
electoral advantages from military service.  The once seemingly constant pattern of 
overrepresentation of military veterans in Congress began to change in the early 
1980s.  This changing pattern continued throughout the 1990s.  In 1995, the 
percentage of military veterans in the public who could seek office was about 39 
percent, and the equivalent number in the House reached its lowest point at 28.9 
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percent.  What we see in the contemporary Congress is underrepresentation rather 
than overrepresentation in congressional military experience.   
 
 
            Source: Bianco and Markham 2001.134 
 
B. Origins of Military Veterans’ Political Behavior 
The decrease of military veterans in Congress is important because of the 
expectation that the military experience provides a broad conceptual prism th ough 
which individuals through which individuals establish preferences towards social 
and political issues.  Researchers have found two mechanisms that influence politi al
values, opinions, and behaviors of military veterans: self-selection and socialization.  
(1) Self-Selection 
                                                

















1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
in the U.S. House (1901-2000)
Figure 4. Prevalence of Military Experience
58 
 
The first mechanism, the self-selection effect, refers to “attitudinal difference 
existing at the time of enlistment.”135  In other words, self-selection means that the 
military draws people whose beliefs and attitudes are sympathetic to those cherished 
by the military.  Focusing on military cadets, Hammill, Segal, and Segal 
hypothesized that the cadets would prefer the importance of self-direction to 
conformity, given their success in school and their parents’ social status as middle
class.  Interestingly, the cadets, although they were still entry-level, almost 
completely agreed with the significance of conformity, demonstrating a strong 
evidence of self-selection effect.136   
Another group of researchers examined the self-selection effect by 
comparing the value orientations and perspectives of people who want to make 
military service a career versus those who do not.  The attitudinal difference between 
the groups has been conceptualized as the prevalence of self-selection.  To tap into 
this possibility, Goertzel and Hengst measured the level of ‘military mind’ of two 
groups: Army Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and their peer male 
undergraduates.  What they found generally confirmed the hypothesis that the Army 
ROTC cadets group, on average, was more likely to show stronger preferences for 
such indicators as personality authoritarianism, intolerance, antagonistic nationalism, 
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and conservatism in political-economic issues than their peers.137  The research done 
by Franke also confirmed attitudinal differences between cadets at the United States 
Military Academy (USMA) at West Point and their civilian peer undergraduate 
students.138  He found substantial differences existed in conservatism, patriotism, and 
warrior mind, with military cadets showing much stronger attachment to these values 
than their peers.  A similar pattern of attitudinal differences between enlistees and 
their civilian counterparts towards various policy issues was found by Bachman et 
al.139  
The above findings can also be explained by a theory of anticipatory 
socialization.140  This theory holds that people who want to be part of a particular 
occupation develop attitudes and values that characterize that occupation.141  
Applying the theory, Caforio found that young people who apply for the military 
academies are to some extent already socialized as a member of an organization in 
the military.142 Although they do not have complete information on the tasks they 
will perform, they choose to be part of the military because they are willing to 
adhere to the set of values that the organization upholds.  
                                                
137 T Goertzel and A Hengst, "The Military Socialization of University Students," Social Problems 19, 
no. 2 (1971). 
138 Franke, "Generation X and the Military: A Comparison of Attitudes and Values between West 
Point Cadets and College Students." 
139 Jerald G. Bachman et al., "Distinctive Military Attitudes among U.S. Enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-
Selection Versus Socialization," Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 4 (2000). 
140 Soeters at al. use natural identification and presocialization to explain the same phenomena. JL 
Soeters, DJ Winslow, and A Weibull, "Military Culture," in Handbook on the Sociology of the 
Military , ed. G Caforio (New York, NY: Plenum Publishers, 2003). 
141 M Rosenberg, Occupations and Values (New York: Arno Press Inc., 1957: 1980); ML Kohn ad C 
Schooler, Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification (Norwood, New 
Jersey: Ablex Pub, 1983). 
142 G Caforio, "Military Officer Education," in Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, ed. 
Giuseppe  Caforio (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2006). 
60 
 
Some recent studies paid attention to the self-selection effect on political 
identification.  Studying the connection between military affiliation and political 
ideology, Rohall et al. found that U.S. Military Academy cadets are more likelyto 
identify themselves as Republicans than civilian undergraduate students.  In fact, the 
difference was substantial: whereas 24.1 percent of their civilian peers were 
classified as Republicans, the equivalent number among military academy cadets 
was 60.7 percent.  They also found that this self-identified party affiliation has a 
direct impact on the level of support for the war in Afghanistan and Iraq: 
Republicans were more likely to support war efforts in those countries.  The same 
tendency of an increasing Republicanization of entrees of the military is also 
evidenced by other scholars.143  
The selection process conducted by the military further sifts through those 
who fit well in the military.144  The military selects those who will help keep the 
military mind set and the military culture that derives from its main functio al 
imperative, “preparing for and fighting war.”145  In addition, given the rigors of 
combat, the military prefer people who will be capable of enduring mental and 
physical hardships and show successful performances. Thus, personnel who are 
selected by the military can be seen as ready to accept the norms and values of that 
organization.146   
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The second mechanism is socialization: Once new members enter the 
military, they are inculcated with the significance of the values that the military 
deems essential.147  Scholars studying organizational identification provide specific 
answers as to why the socialization process is particularly influential.   According to 
Van Maanen, organizational socialization takes two dimensions: investiture and 
divestiture processes.  Investiture process accepts the incoming members’ identity to 
create a new organizational identity.  On the other hand, divestiture process replaces 
the newcomers’ identity for organizationally situated identities.148  In particular, 
professional organizations and religious organizations have a special emphasis on 
divestiture process. “In order to reconstruct the newcomer’s social identity, such 
organizations often remove symbols of newcomer’s previous identities; restrict or 
isolate newcomers from external contact; disparage newcomer’s status, knowledge, 
and ability; impose new identification symbols; rigidly prescribe and proscribe 
behavior and punish infractions; and reward assumption of the new identity.”149  
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Practices done in West Point150 and the Marine Corps151 are good examples of this 
divesture process.  A similar process can be observed in the ROTC programs.  The 
military educational system in civilian universities helps keep cadets from being 
civilized.152  
From this perspective, the divestiture process is especially distinguishable 
from that in other organizations.  Military officers are “rebuilt” through a long period 
of military training, education, and exercise.  The military as a “total institution”153 
requires members to go through a rigorous socialization process in which they learn 
to engage in “consistent and predictable behavior because they have learned that 
inconsistent behavior produces too many costs that may damage reputation, impose 
penalties, or deny promotions or other benefits.”154  In addition, frequent field 
exercises function as an important mechanism through which the military facilitates 
organizational coherence among military officers.155 In sum, a strong divestiture 
process—which inculcates military personnel with a very distinct set of 
organizational requirements, beliefs, and values that are different from the dominant 
societal life style—enables members to strongly identify with an organization and 
internalize organization norms.  Thus, members of the military come to have a 
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common perspective that differs from civilians who have not gone through such a 
rigorous process.  It is therefore expected that this process of socialization allows the 
military to “carry a claim to uniqueness.”156  
Group-oriented activities such as military exercises and combat operati ns 
also strengthen the conformity of individuals to military values.157  According to 
social psychologists, as a result of the rigorous training and drills they undergo, 
soldiers learn the importance of following organizational rules that reduce the risks 
and maximize the possibility of accomplishing organizational goals.158  These 
functionally oriented group activities “minimize the confusion and disintegraive 
consequences of battle by imposing order on it with a repertoire of patterned actions 
that they may use on their own initiative, or in coordination with others, quickly to 
adapt and to prevail in battle.”159   
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C. The Military, Military Veterans, and Defense Spending  
The analyses in the previous section explain why military personnel are 
expected to have a set of values, perspectives, and opinions different from their 
civilian counterparts.  In addition to that information, how different are military 
veterans from nonveterans in terms of preference on defense spending?  Before 
answering this question, it is important to investigate what the military’s preference 
is regarding defense spending.  The logic of this examination is that as a result of 
self-selection and socialization, political preferences of military veterans are 
assumed to reflect what the military as an institution prefers.   
The dominant view of military’s preference on defense spending is that 
military always wants more resources.  Various theories explain the penchant of the 
military for resources.  First, some scholars argue that the military conservatism 
drives the military to demand a higher level of spending on military affairs.  As we 
saw in the previous chapter, Huntington showed the reason why the military always 
tries to build a powerful force.160  Because of its pessimistic view about interstate 
relations and the possibility of resolving interstate conflicts through diplomatic and 
economic means, the military wants to have available and usable means at hand.  In 
addition, the tendency of the military to over exaggerate external military threats can 
be a source of the military’s insatiable demand for more resources.   
Second, other scholars point out that the military’s preference for offensive 
doctrine and strategy can lead to military requests for a higher level of military funds 
                                                
160 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 
65 
 
for national defense.  According to Posen, offensive doctrines of the United States 
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were the major cause of constant military 
build-up in the two countries.  A central element of offensive military doctrine is to 
strike first in order to end the war in a short period of time.  For this purpose, the two 
countries tried to better equip offensive capabilities, leading to an arms race.161  
Snyder makes a similar point, arguing that the reason major participants of the First 
World War employed “self-defeating, war-causing” offensive strategies was because 
of the militaries’ tendency to “use wartime operational strategy o solve its 
institutional problems,” a phenomenon called “cult of the offensive.”162  As an effort 
to maintain institutional autonomy and status, and to resolve organizational disputes 
within the military, militaries sought offensive doctrines, a consequence of which 
was their insistence on augmenting military capabilities.   
Third, the proclivity for advanced technology can be a source of the 
military’s constant pursuit for an increase in military spending.  Based on insights of 
institutional culture, Murray argues that without the reality check of war, militaries 
tend to focus on the materialistic aspects of military capabilities (e.g. the number of 
weapons systems) in peace time.  Among other things, this tendency often leads to a 
perceptual bias to consider the scale of resources that the military enjoys as the 
overall preparation for war.  As a consequence, mental and doctrinal aspects of 
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military preparation are often neglected.163  Other scholars point out that the 
penchant for technology is especially strong in the Air Force and Navy.164 
From different theoretical perspectives, the above mentioned theories reach 
the same conclusion about the preference of the military for military spending: it 
wants a larger share of the federal budget.  If the military exhibits this penchant for 
more resources, we can assume that its members will have a similar preferenc  for 
military spending.   
What can be said about military veterans?  Do they keep the military mind 
that they learned after they retire?  The fundamental reason that scholars worry about 
the decreasing number of military veterans in the public, and especially in polit cal 
institutions, reflects the expectation that military veterans represent military 
perspectives in society: “[S]ervice in the U.S. military is an important socialization 
experience that shapes individuals’ attitudes.  The military teaches lessons about the 
role of military force in American foreign policy and lessons about how military 
force ought to be used. These lessons do not appear to be forgotten when individuals 
leave the military and enter civilian life.”165  In this regard, Burk called veterans 
“cultural bearers” and emphasized that the socialization process continues even aft r 
the veterans are discharged:  
Not to be overlooked as culture bearers are veterans. Recruiters for today's 
volunteer forces are well aware that veterans among family and friends 
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greatly influence the attitudes of young people toward enlisting in the 
service. Once discharged, some veterans have been sufficiently affected by 
the experience of military service to join veterans' associations. These 
associations typically provide opportunities for socializing in clubs with
people who have shared experiences similar to one's own. But they are also 
engaged in local community service or vaguely patriotic civic education 
projects. And they are integrated into larger national networks that keep 
them appraised of military affairs and lobby for veterans' benefits.166 
 
 
 Empirical research on military veterans’ political attitudes and behavior 
provides some evidence on the notion that they maintain a set of norms, values, and 
expectations that differ from nonveterans.  First of all, a number of scholars have 
examined whether a specific political ideology and party affiliation is prevalent 
among military veterans.  Specifically, given the conservative nature of military 
service,167 they expected that military veterans are more likely to associate 
themselves with conservatism.168  Evidence supports this hypothesis.  According to 
one of the most comprehensive studies, compared to 31.5 percent among civilian 
non-veteran leaders, 51.6 percent of civilian veteran leaders identified themselv s as 
having somewhat or very conservative ideology.169  The level of conservatism 
among military veterans was a little less apparent compared with activemil tary 
leaders (66 percent), but it was still substantial.  A similar pattern was also found 
between veterans and nonveterans in the general population.170  A distinction 
between veterans and nonveterans is also found in their party affiliation. Civilian 
                                                
166 Burk, "Military Culture," 460. 
167 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations; Snider, 
"An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture." 
168 Eitelberg and Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War." 
169 Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the 
Start of a New Millennium," 33.   
170 About a half of veterans in the general public said they have somewhat or very conservative 
ideology whereas about 38 percent of nonveterans were id ntified as conservatives.  Ibid. 
68 
 
veteran leaders are more Republican than their non-veteran counterparts by about 16 
percent.  Even if scholars still have not reached an agreement on the source of this  
phenomenon,171 the result confirmed a growing tendency of Republicanization in the 
military and its enduring influence on military veterans.172   
 This does not mean that the so-called veteran effect is a common 
phenomenon.  If the veteran effect means a closely connected set of preferences 
quite different from those of non-veterans, this hypothesis has been partially 
supported.  For example, an earlier panel study examined whether military ve e ans 
and their nonveteran peers show attitudinal differences in cynicism, support for the 
Vietnam War, and confidence in the performance of American leadership.  They did 
not find a clear pattern of difference between the two groups.173  A similar result was 
                                                
171 The scholarship in the civil-military has debated over the source of this military mind of active and 
retired members of the military.  Largely, self-selection and socialization have been the sources of a 
distinct set of values and perspectives of the current and former members of the military. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, this debate is insignificant.  Whether the so-called military mind comes 
from self-selection or socialization, the outcome of the processes is similar, leading to a conclusion 
that, in many respects, military members are different from those without prior military experience. 
For the debate over the two sources of military mind, see Bachman et al., "Distinctive Military 
Attitudes among U.S. Enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-Selection Versus Socialization."; Jerald G. Bachman, 
Lee Sigelman, and Greg Diamond, "Self-Selection, Socialization, and Distinctive Military Values: 
Attitudes of High School Seniors," Armed Forces & Society 13, no. 2 (1987); JE Dorman, "Rotc 
Cadet Attitudes: A Product of Socialization or Self-Selection?," Journal of political and military 
sociology 4(1976); Goertzel and Hengst, "The Military Socializ tion of University Students." 
172 For example, Desch argued that Republicanization of the military mainly originates from the fact 
that a substantial portion of military personnel comes from the Southern region of the United States 
where the Republican Party receives pretty strong support. On the other hand, Segal et al. maintained 
that a strong Republican preference in the military generally reflected a societal change that an 
increasing number of people identified themselves as Republicans. See M Desch, "Explaining the 
Gap: Assessing Alternative Theories of the Divergence of Civilian and Military Cultures," in Soldiers 
and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). Segal et al., "Attitudes of Entry-Level Enlisted Personnel: Pro-
Military and Politically Mainstreamed." 
173 MK Jennings and GB Markus, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel 
Study," The American Political Science Review 71, no. 1 (1977). 
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found in other studies as well.174  This shows that the expectation of military 
veterans with a distinct and consistent pattern of preferences may depend on political
contexts and issue areas.   
Nonetheless, studies show the existence of strong veteran effects on key 
issues with direct bearing on military capabilities: “The only consistent distinctions 
on which the various researchers might agree relate to veterans’ high affect for the 
military and opinions regarding increased military preparedness.”175  It may be that 
even if military veterans differ over the social issues, they can be in agreement with 
the necessity of a capable military.  A strong influence of the exposure to th  
military on veterans’ opinions toward defense policies is documented by Fordham.  
With regard to the question of whether the military budget should be reduced to 
increase the federal budget for education, Fordham found that about 61 percent of 
military veterans were opposed to the policy recommendation.176  This number was 
in contrast with the fact that only about 44 percent of civilians who had not served in 
the military were against the proposition.  With the same question, about 85 percent 
of active-duty military officers were in opposition to the idea. A similar pattern was 
found in terms of veterans’ opinion on mandatory military service system for males.  
About 73 percent of the veterans surveyed agreed with the need for the adoption of 
conscription, whereas about 50 percent of non-veterans supported the idea.  For an 
                                                
174 JG Bachman and MK Jennings, "The Impact of Vietnam on Trust in Government," Journal of 
Social Issues 31, no. 4 (1975). 
175 Teigen, "The Role of Previous Military Service in American Electoral Politics", 20. 
176 Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on 
Peacetime Military Policy." A similar pattern is also documented by Holsti. Holsti, "Of Chasms and 




understandable reason, the active-duty military officers showed a prominent support 
for the policy recommendation with about 82 percent of respondents agreeing.  
These findings confirmed the results of earlier studies.  An analysis by Schreiber 
showed that even if Vietnam veterans and World War II veterans were different in 
their confidence in the military leadership, with the former suspicious and the lat er 
positive, they all agreed with a policy of spending more on the military.177   
 
D. Research Hypothesis 
 So far, this dissertation has reviewed theoretical reasons that military 
veterans have a pattern of preferences that differ from nonveterans, especially on 
defense spending.  To summarize, military experience shapes values and 
perspectives of military personnel through such mechanisms as self-selection and 
socialization.  Also, theories such as military conservatism, the military’s preference 
for offensive doctrines, and technology show that the military wants to enjoy a larger
share of societal resources.  Empirical findings about veterans’ political opinions 
confirm this expectation: military veterans are more likely to prefer a policy position 
that supports a higher proportion of national resource for the military.    
 Thus it can be argued that military veterans may work as a bridge between 
the military establishment and civilians who do not have a first-hand experience.  In 
effect, veterans represent military preferences in public discussions and 
policymaking processes concerning military affairs.  Conceptualized this way, we 
                                                
177 EM Schreiber, "Enduring Effects of Military Service-Opinion Differences between US Veterans 
and Nonveterans," Social Forces 57(1978). 
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can theorize the relationship between the prevalence of military experience in society 
and the realization of military preferences on policy outcomes.   A larger number of 
military veterans in society would mean a narrow gap between the military and 
society, leading to an enhanced probability that what the military wants will be 
accepted by society.  The more military veterans are in society, the more likely that 
military preferences are reflected and realized in decision making process.   
 Two mechanisms through which military veterans may influence policy 
making process over military budget are conceivable.  First, it is possible that the 
opinions of military veterans in the general public may have an influence on policy 
decisions about military spending.  States this way, theories of public opinions are 
relevant.  A key mechanism behind theories of public opinions is the electoral 
connection between the preferences of the public and legislative behavior of 
politicians.  Thus, any hypothesis explaining variations in military budget as a 
function of military veterans in the public necessarily uses the same infer nce of the 
electoral connection: the preferences of military veterans will be deliver d to 
politicians, and the politicians respond to this due to the electoral influence of 
military veterans.    
 In the case of military veterans, however, it is not clear whether politicians 
recognize them as an influential voting bloc.  Even though studies show military 
veterans in the public can act as a voting bloc under limited circumstances, the 
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instances such as this are rare. 178  The assumption of the electoral connection may be 
not particularly strong as a theoretical rationale179, although we cannot completely 
rule out the influence of military veterans in the public: The impact may be indirect.  
A more direct influence on military budget can be evaluated by looking at the 
military veterans in political institutions.   
 An alternative way is to theorize the relationship between the prevalence of 
military veterans in political institutions and the variations of military spending.  
With the assumption of the veteran effects, Gelpi and Feaver examined how the 
prevalence of military experience in political institutions has affected th  ecisions 
related to use of force in interstate conflicts.  They hypothesized that milit ry 
preferences for use of force are more likely to be reflected in policy decisions when 
military veterans in political institutions increase.  The findings showed that the 
extent of military veterans is negatively related to the instances of interstate conflicts 
and positively associated with the size of military force used, which confirmed the 
hypothesis.   
                                                
178 Teigen, "Veterans' Party Identification, Candidate Affect, and Vote Choice in the 2004 US 
Presidential Election." Bishin and Incantalupo call the expectation of veterans’ voting as a bloc the 
“veterans’ vote”.  They define it as “a cohesive group that votes as a bloc owing to shared (military 
experiences, socialization, interests, and outlook.” BG Bishin and MB Incantalupo, "From Bullets to 
Ballots? The Role of Veterans in Contemporary Elections," (University of California, Riverside, 
2008), 3. http://www.themonkeycage.org/veterans.paper.named.pdf (accessed 3 January 2010). For 
studies and public perceptions that military veterans vote as a cohesive bloc, see Ceci Connolly, 
"Battle for Veterans' Vote Heats up; Gore Cites Commit ent to Military; Gop Rivals Lambaste 
Administration's Record," Washington Post, Jan. 27th 1999; David D. Kirkpatrick, "Kerry's Pitch to 
Veterans Meets G.O.P. Counterattack," New York Times, Aug. 3rd 2004. 
179 WT Bianco, "Last Post for" the Greatest Generation": The Policy Implications of the Decline of 
Military Experience in the US Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2005). 
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 A study by Fordham attempted to test if a significant relationship exists 
between the changes in military veterans and the level of defense outlays.180  I find 
two problems in his analysis that makes it difficult for a reader to draw meaningful 
conclusions.  First, Fordham does not specify the causal mechanism.  I agree with his 
general hypothesis that the decrease of military veterans would lead to a significant 
drop or fluctuations of the level of defense spending.  What is missing in his analysis, 
however, is his claim about how the increase or decrease in the number of military 
veterans influences defense spending.  Is it through political pressures of military 
veterans in the general public?  Alternatively, do military veterans in political 
institutions impact these decisions?  Fordham did not make clear through which 
causal mechanisms defense spending reflects the preference of military veterans.  
This was apparent when the key independent variable, the prevalence of military 
experience, was not adequately defined and measured.  Therefore, his conclusion 
that there is no relationship between the prevalence of military experience and 
military spending is questionable.   
 Second, Fordham did not consider any control variables that may influence 
defense spending.  Scholars have documented that the level of defense spending is 
determined by a set of factors such as external threat, economic conditions, and 
political and ideological variables.  Controlling for those factors can provide a better
understanding of the real impact of the civil-military gap on defense spending.  In 
sum, Fordham’s study does not shed much light on the relationship between civil-
                                                
180 Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on 
Peacetime Military Policy." 
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military gap and defense spending due to ambiguous causal mechanisms and omitted 
variables.   
 The present study attempts to fill this research void left by Fordham by 
testing the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.  The more military veterans in political institutions, the larger the 






III. Research Method 
 
1. Scope  
The present research covers the period between fiscal years 1952 and 2000, 
which means that this study encompasses most of the Cold War period and the first
decade of the post-Cold War era.181  This study covers 2000 because the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the 
nature of external threat to the U.S. national security.  There have not been serious 
efforts to define and measure threats from international terrorist groups, and 
incorporate these new threats to the definitions of external threats focusing on 
conventional interstate relations.  Recognizing that this new dimension indicates that 
additional areas will need to be studied, it seems appropriate to examine the period 
up until 2000.   
    
2. Operationalization and Measurement of the Variables 
 
A. Dependent Variable: Defense Spending 
In scholarly discussions about military spending, I identify three widely usd
alternatives that measure fiscal efforts devoted to national defense: defense burden, 
defense budget outlays, and defense budget authority by Congress.182  Although the 
                                                
181 Fordham noted that fiscal year 1951 was the first budget that was passed through the legislative 
process stipulated in NSC 68. Ibid. As will be shown later, this study takes one year lagged variables 
in the analysis in order to reflect the institutional decision making procedure concerning defense 
spending. I omitted FY 1951 from the analysis because I assume that FY 1952 better reflects the 
impact of the new budgetary process established by NSC 68.  
182 Another possible measurement is defense budget request by presidents. Kanter, "Congress and the 
Defense Budget: 1960-1970."  
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first indicator, defense burden, is widely used especially in comparative analyses of 
the determinants of defense spending, this current study uses two alternatives for the 
following reason.  Defense burden, which measures defense expenditure as 
percentage of GDP, does not provide detailed information on military spending.  
Although this measurement has been widely used in comparative studies in order to 
solve the difficulties in determining comparable currency units across countries183, 
defense burden does not contain information on defense efforts allocated to specific 
programs.  The other two alternatives are preferable in this sense. 
The second option, defense budget outlays, gauges actual government 
expenditure for national defense spent at a given fiscal year.184  Military expenditure 
data in government spending documents provide not only the overall military 
spending level, but also the information on how much money the government spent 
for specific subfunctions.  This can give researchers an analytical advantage to detect 
patterns that do not appear when only focusing on the overall scale of military 
spending.   
 The last alternative is defense budget authority.  Budget authority indicates 
the amount of money that government agencies are allowed to use by Congress, 
                                                
183RP Smith, "Models of Military Expenditure," Journal of Applied Econometrics 4, no. 4 (1989); BE 
Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 47, no. 5 (2003). Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and 
Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978."; E Benoit, "Growth and Defense in 
Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26, no. 2 (1978); Goldsmith, 
"Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?."; Chowdhury, "A Causal Analysis of 
Defense Spending and Economic Growth."; DB Stewart, "Economic Growth and the Defense Burden 
in Africa and Latin America: Simulations from a Dynamic Model," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 40, no. 1 (1991); G Palmer, "Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of 
Defense Spending," American Journal of Political Science (1990). 
184 Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on 
Peacetime Military Policy." 
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which does its business through authorizations and appropriations in a fiscal year.   
Budget authority as the analytical focus, like defense budget outlays, offers detailed 
information on military spending allocated to particular functions and subfunctions.   
While defense expenditure and defense budget authority are useful indicators 
of defense spending, there is a critical difference.  When we conceptualize defense 
spending as a realization of policy preferences generated by more fundamental 
factors such as ideology and military experience, defense outlays may cover rather 
than reveal any regular pattern of relationships between those factors and military
spending.  This is so because of the nature of defense outlays.  A researcher makes 
clear the distinction between outlays and budget authority by using an analogy: 
“Annual budget authority is analogous to authority to contract for a new house this 
year.  Outlays are analogous to the house payments that will pay off that contract 
over the next twenty or thirty years.”185  In other words, defense outlays at a given 
year are the results of policy preferences that were imposed in the previous seeral
years. 
An illustration may help to clarify the distinction between defense outlays 
and defense budget authority described above.  According to the Office of 
Management and Budget, budget authority recommended by Congress for FY 2011 
is 3,691 billion dollars.  About 2,933 billion dollars of budget authority for FY 
                                                
185 James True, "Historic Budget Records Converted to the Present Functional Categorization with 
Actual Results for Fy 1947-2008," Policy Agendas Project, 
http://www.policyagendas.org/datasets/index.html (accessed March 15, 2010). Also see, Office of 
Management and Budget, "Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 
2011," ed. Government Printing Office (Government Printing Office, 2010).  
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2011—that is 79.4 percent—is to be spent in 2011.  In other words, the remaining 
757 billion dollars will be used in the future years.  On the other hand, the total 
amount of federal budget outlays in 2011 is expected to be 3,824 billion dollars.  The 
above mentioned 2,933 billion dollars of budget authority is included here.  The 
remaining 901 billion dollars is the amount of money that was authorized, but not 
spent in the previous years.186  This illustration demonstrates the reason why defense 
outlays is often preferred as an indicator of defense spending because it actually 
shows how much money is spent at a given year.  Still, this study also pays attention 
to what Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, and Aranson point out about the theoretical 
importance of budget authority from a different point of view: “[R]esearchers 
interested in analyzing budgeting decisions at the level of policy makers … would
find outlays to be an inferior choice.”187   
Given this often neglected difference of what constitutes defense outlays and 
budget authority, I assume that if there is any causal linkage between the main 
independent variables—ideology and military experience—and defense spending, it 
should be more apparent in budget authority than defense outlays.  More broadly 
speaking, the two indicators of defense spending may be shaped by a different set of 
factors.  Thus, dealing with the two indicators of defense spending, I will provide an 
indirect test of the relationships between those indicators and civil-military gaps.  In 
this sense, this study contributes to both civil-military relations literature and studies 
                                                
186 Office of Management and Budget, "Analytical Perspctives, Budget of the U.S. Government, 
Fiscal Year 2011," 126. 
187 H Dezhbakhsh, SM Tohamy, and PH Aranson, "A New Approach for Testing Budgetary 
Incrementalism," The Journal of Politics 65, no. 02 (2003): 548. 
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of defense spending by considering defense outlays and budget authority as separate 
dependent variables.   
One thing to be noted here is that defense outlays and budget authority adopts 
functional classifications, which stress the purpose of the spending.  What this mean
is that the financing for national defense is actually shared by several departments 
and agencies with relevance to national security.  Table 2 below shows the structure 
of defense spending.  Under the current functional categorization systems of the U.S. 
government budget arrangements, the function of national defense under the title
‘050’ is divided into three key subfunctions.  One of the subfunctions is named ‘051 
Department of Defense-Military’, which is most directly related to the development, 
maintenance, and equipment of the U.S. military.   
This study operationalizes defense spending as defense outlays and budget 
authority under the title ‘050 National Defense’.  When necessary, it uses data on 
defense spending with regard to specific subfunctions.  For defense outlays, this 
study uses the official defense spending data published by the Government Printig 
Office (GPO).  The defense outlays figures are calculated in fiscal year 2000 
constant dollars.188  For budget authority information, this study employs the dataset 
provided by the Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas.  The budget data 
is measured in fiscal year 2008 constant dollars.189  Figure 6 shows changes in 
                                                
188 GPO, "Budget of the United States Government: Historical Tables Fiscal Year 2006," 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005). 
189 This website was the recipient of the American Politica  Science Association’s 2007 best 
instructional website award. The budget dataset can be obtained at 
http://www.policyagendas.org/datasets/index.html (accessed March 20, 2010).  
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budget authority between 1952 and 2000.  Annual changes in defense outlays are 
shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 6. U.S. Defense Budget Authority (1952-2000)
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B. Independent Variables 
(1) Strength of Conservatism in Congress 
 One of the main interests of this study is to examine the influence of 
ideological changes on military spending.  As opposed to ideology of individual 
legislators, this study deals with changes in ideology at the institutional level.  Thus, 
it employs a conceptualization and measurement of a ‘central ideological tendency in 
Congress as a collectivity’.   
 To capture this central ideological tendency, this study uses the adjusted 
ADA scores to measure the intensity of conservatism in Congress in a given year.190  
The nominal scores come from the ratings of roll call votes of individual legislator  
by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).  Scholars have modified the 
original nominal ADA scores for individual congressmen and chambers to make 
them comparable across time.191  Employing the adjusted ADA scores enables 
researchers not only to assess how liberal or conservative each chamber is but also to 
estimate changes in ideological patterns in Congress over time.192  Although this 
method has been subject to criticisms and some scholars have provided alternatives 
to measure congressional ideological composition193, the method of estimating 
                                                
190 The dataset for adjusted ADA scores between 1947 and 2007 can be obtained at 
http://habel.siuc.edu/data/ (accessed March 28, 2010). Also see S Anderson and P Habel, "Revisiting 
Adjusted Ada Scores for the US Congress, 1947-2007," Political Analysis 17(Winter 2009). 
191 T Groseclose, SD Levitt, and JM Snyder Jr, "Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and 
Chambers: Adjusted Ada Scores for the US Congress," American Political Science Review 93, no. 1 
(1999). 
192 Anderson and Habel, "Revisiting Adjusted Ada Scores for the US Congress, 1947-2007." 
193 For instance, Jackson and Kingdon criticized scholarly efforts to deduce ideological positions from 
voting behaviors by arguing that the method cannot av id the risk of a tautology. They also argued 
that this method cannot capture the possibility that considerations in legislative votes may not be 
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members’ ideologies using interest group ratings has been used by many in 
analyzing legislative behaviors.194  In addition, the fact that ADA ideology scores are 
highly correlated with other alternatives such as Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-
NOMINATE scores also supports the relevance of this method.195   
It is important to note that this study does not aim to analyze the influence of 
ideology on individual legislators’ voting behavior concerning specific policy issues.  
Instead, it attempts to see if yearly changes of the central ideological tendency in 
Congress leads to increase or decrease in military spending.  As a consequence, the 
aim of this study makes the usage of this methodology less susceptible to the 
problems that critics raised.196 
The data used in this study includes nominal and adjusted ADA scores for 
each chamber between 1947 and 2007, measured with yearly chamber means and 
                                                                                                                                         
unidimentional, but multidimensional. See, John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, "Ideology, Interest 
Group Scores, and Legislative Votes," American Journal of Political Science 36, no. 3 (1992). Hill, 
Hanna, and Shafqat pointed out that this method is “an indirect measure of ideology” and presented 
an alternative measurement that employs newspaper content analysis of legislators’ remarks on policy 
issues. See Kim Quaile Hill, Stephen Hanna, and Sahar S afqat, "The Liberal-Conservative Ideology 
of U.S. Senators: A New Measure," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 4 (1997). Wittkopf 
and McCormick used Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE scores to measure ideology. See Eugene 
R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, "Congress, the Pr sident, and the End of the Cold War: Has 
Anything Changed?," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4 (1998).  
194 GA Krause, "Partisan and Ideological Sources of Fiscal Deficits in the United States," American 
Journal of Political Science 44, no. 3 (2000); S Ansolabehere, JM Snyder Jr, and C Stewart III, 
"Candidate Positioning in US House Elections," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 
(2001); W Bernhard and BR Sala, "The Remaking of an American Senate: The 17th Amendment and 
Ideological Responsiveness," The Journal of Politics 68, no. 02 (2008); MA Bailey, "Comparable 
Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions fr the Court, Congress, and Presidency," 
American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 3 (2007). 
195 Barry C. Burden, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Tim Groseclose, "Measuring the Ideologies of U. S. 
Senators: The Song Remains the Same," L gislative Studies Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2000). KT Poole and 
H Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). Another alternative measure of ideology in Congress as a whole is the use of 
adjusted ADA median. I examined the level of correlation between adjusted ADA mean and median 
and found the two measures are highly correlated (r = 0.87).   
196 BG Bishin, "Independently Validating Ideology Measures: A Look at Nominate and Adjusted Ada 
Scores," American Politics Research 31, no. 4 (2003). 
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medians scores.  Because this study focuses on the central ideological tendency of 
Congress, it uses annual chamber means scores between 1952 and 2000 to measure 
the tendency.  Specifically, the strength of ideology for each year is calculated by 
summing the means scores of each chamber and then dividing by two.  The values 
derived from this process are transformed so that higher values indicate increased 
conservatism at a given year.  These transformed values are first-differenced to 
gauge annual changes in ideology.   
Figure 7 shows the pattern of ideological change in Congress between 1952 
and 2000.  Conservatism in Congress was relatively strong until the late 1950s, 
which supports Huntington’s argument of favorable political conditions for the 
military during this period.197  This was followed by a significant change toward 
liberalism until the mid-1970s.  This dramatic change seems to confirm such 
political transformations as liberalization of southern Democrats in Congress since 
the enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and other Civil Rights movements as 
well as the impact of the Vietnam War that led to the influx of liberal Democrats to 
Congress.198  The conservatism in Congress increased during the early 1980s.  It 
slowly declined since then until the mid-1990s when the Republican Party took the 
control of the House. 
This study expects that changes in ideology toward conservatism will lead to 
increase in defense spending.   
                                                
197 Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 11. 
198 R Fleisher, "Explaining the Change in Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Southern Democrats," The 
Journal of Politics 55, no. 2 (1993). Also see KT Poole and H Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-
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(2) Presence of Military Veterans in the House and Cabinet 
 Measuring the veteran status is straightforward: People who served in the 
military are considered military veterans.  Thus, politicians with servic  experience 
in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and National Guard are 
all included in this category.   
As stated in the previous chapter, this study focuses on military veterans in 
political institutions.  It operationalizes the presence of military veterans as the 
percentage of military veterans in the House of Representatives and the Cabin t 
following the concept proposed by Gelpi and Feaver.199  The original dataset 
gathered by Gelpi and Feaver covers until 1992.  Therefore, the data between 1993 
and 2000 were collected based on the coding scheme that Gelpi and Feaver 
employed.200   
 By adopting the same measurement concept, I examine if the major finding 
of Gelpi and Feaver’s study—the influence of the varying degrees of the presence of 
military veterans in political institutions on the U.S. conflict behaviors—helps 
understand changes in military spending.  Specifically, they found that the 
prevalence of military experience measured by the percentage of military veterans in 
the House and the Cabinet was positively related to the use of force for inter-state 
                                                
199 In a correspondence (received 1st February 2010) with one of the authors, Christopher G lpi, he 
noted that a subsequent study that included military veterans in the Senate did not change the results 
they found in the previous study published in 2002.  Also see Gelpi and Feaver, "Speak Softly and 
Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force." 
200 The data on the percentage of military veterans in the House were collected from the dataset by 
Bianco. Bianco and Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. 
Congress." The data for veteran status of the Cabinet members come from the following source. R 
Sobel and DB Sicilia, The United States Executive Branch: A Biographical Directory of Heads of 
State and Cabinet Officials (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2003).  
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conflicts—what they termed “realpolitik” purposes.  In contrast, as the percentage of 
military veterans in political institutions decreased, they found that it was more 
likely that military force was used for “interventionalist” purposes which were less 
directly related to ensuring essential national interests.201   
 Figure 8 shows the changes in the percentage of elite military veterans in the 
House and Cabinet.  There are two noticeable trends to be found.  First, up until the 
mid-1980s at least half of the politicians in the institutions were military veterans.  
This was largely the outcome of the draft system.  Numbers were at their peak in 
1973.  Second, the decline of military veterans since the mid-1980s is obvious.  As 
the new generation of politicians who did not need to serve in the military under the 
new All-Volunteer Force (AVF) personnel system takes a larger proportion of 
congressional seats and positions in the Cabinet, the number of politicians with any 
form of military experience are becoming rare.  This was particularly the case during 
the Clinton administration.  In 1996, only 28 percent of politicians had military 
experience.  Annual changes in the military experience variable are mesured by 
first-differencing the variable.   
 This study anticipates that the percentage of military veterans has a positive 
relationship with the level of defense spending.   
 
C. Control Variables 
(1) Incrementalism in Defense Budgeting  
                                                
201 Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force. 
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 Incremental nature of the budgetary process has been widely researched and 
confirmed.  Scholars have adopted various terms to explain this phenomenon. 
Satisficing202, muddling through203, and budgetary incrementalism204 are some of 
those terms.  Although budgetary incrementalism has been challenged over the 
extent of its pervasiveness205 and statistical adequacy of early studies206, scholars 
interested in the determinants of military spending still find it necessary to consider 
incremental budgetary strategies for theoretical and analytical reasons.207  Thus, to 
test the importance of the military spending in the previous year in estimating the 
level of current spending, this study includes a lagged dependent variable in the 
analysis.  
 
(2) Presidential Administration 
 Studies on voting behavior have documented interesting findings about issue 
ownership.  The theory of issue ownership tells us about the importance of voter 
perceptions on what each candidate is better able to handle and how individual 
                                                
202 HA Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, no. 
1 (1955). 
203 CE Lindblom, "The Science of" Muddling Through"," Public administration review 19, no. 2 
(1959). 
204 OA Davis, MAH Dempster, and A Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," The 
American Political Science Review 60, no. 3 (1966). Also see  
205 For example, Jones, Baumgartner, and True challenged incrementalism by showing the existence 
of two large-scale punctuations in the United States. BD Jones, F Baumgartner, and J True, "Policy 
Punctuations: US Budget Authority, 1947-95," Journal of Politics 60, no. 1 (1998).   
206 Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, and Aranson, "A New Approach for Testing Budgetary Incrementalism." 
207 Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?."; Eichenberg and Stoll, 
"Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western 
Europe."; Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978."; Andrew Kydd, "Arms Races and Arms Control: 
Modeling the Hawk Perspective," American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 2 (2000); Palmer, 
"Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of De ense Spending." 
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candidates try to shape public perceptions so that they can win political benefits.  
Studies have also found these public perceptions are often associated with political
parties: voters possess a sense of the “issue handling reputations of the parties.”208 
and behave accordingly by supporting parties that they believe could solve the 
critical issues.209  In the U. S., the Democratic Party has been considered better at 
dealing with social welfare issues and education.  And voters have regarded the 
Republican Party better at handling such issues as deficit, tax, and defense policy.210  
A recent survey study found that Republican issue ownership over military and 
security issues is also evident among the Army officers, even after years of hardship 
and struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan.211  The importance of issue ownership is also 
evidenced not only in the studies on voting behaviors but also strategic behaviors of 
parties and candidates to take advantage of positive images by emphasizing their 
relative strengths in election campaigns. 212  
 Particularly relevant to this dissertation is the question of whether issue
ownership is actually manifested in the outcome of defense policy and military 
spending.  The conventional wisdom gives us reasons to expect that Republican 
                                                
208 John R. Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," American 
Journal of Political Science 40, no. 3 (1996): 826. 
209 JR Petrocik, WL Benoit, and GJ Hansen, "Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952-
2000," Political Science Quarterly (2003); DF Damore, "The Dynamics of Issue Ownership in 
Presidential Campaigns," Political Research Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2004); KM Kaufmann and JR 
Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap," 
American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 3 (1999); WG Jacoby, "Issue Framing and Public 
Opinion on Government Spending," American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (2000). 
210 Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." 
211 Urben, "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms". 
212 É Bélanger and BM Meguid, "Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and Issue-Based Vote Choice," 
Electoral Studies 27, no. 3 (2008); D Hayes, "Candidate Qualities through a Partisan Lens: A Theory 
of Trait Ownership," American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 4 (2005). 
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administrations take defense issues more seriously, and as a consequence allocate a 
higher share of national resource to national defense than do Democratic 
administrations.  In fact, this was what many expected at the beginning of the 
Republican administration led by George W. Bush.  After the Clinton administration, 
which was considered lacking an adequate appreciation and understanding of the 
military, the expectations about a healthy civil-military relations and a high priority 
in national defense were high among observers in and outside the military.213   
 At the same time, there exist studies that make the realization of issue 
ownership in actual outcomes of defense policy process look suspicious.  For 
example, Ippolito’s analysis shows that defense policy, an area in which presidential 
dominance was once apparent due to the significance of national defense in the wake 
of the Cold War, has seen increasing number of participants including Congress.  He 
argues that this decentralization has made it difficult for presidents to impose their 
preferences on defense policy.  The consequence of decentralization is that 
allocation of defense budget has been unstable and unpredictable, and this 
undermines a consistent development of force structure and military strategy.214  In 
addition, the rapid increase of nondiscretionary spending in federal budgets has 
                                                
213 MC Desch, "Bush and the Generals," Foreign Aff. 86(2007); Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your 
Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force. 
214 DS Ippolito, Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of De ense (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1994). Also see B Rundquist and TM Carsey, Congress and 
Defense Spending: The Distributive Politics of Military Procurement (Norman, Oklahoma: Univ of 
Oklahoma Pr, 2002); BM Blechman and WP Ellis, The Politics of National Security: Congress and 
US Defense Policy (Oxford University Press, 1992); JM Lindsay and RBipley, "Foreign and 
Defense Policy in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s," Legislative Studies Quarterly 17, no. 
3 (1992); RB Ripley and JM Lindsay, Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol 
Hill  (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Univ of Michigan Pr, 1993). 
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reduced the amount of national resources that presidents, including Republican 
presidents, could use for their policy priority.215  If this expectation holds, we will 
see no systematic relationship between presidential administrations and military 
spending.  
 We can also expect that military spending increases under Democratic 
administrations from a different theoretical perspective.  Principal-agent models 
assume that there exists an information asymmetry between principals and agents.216  
They further assume that expertise and information control are the basis of the 
bureaucracy’s power.217  If we loosen the assumption of the information asymmetry 
to assume that principals have varying degrees of expertise, the information 
advantage of the bureaucracy becomes a variable, not a constant.218  Applying this 
logic to the relationship between presidential administrations and the military, it may 
mean that the military influence is stronger in Democratic administrations han 
Republican administrations, to the extent that the latter possesses more competence 
and expertise in military affairs than the former.  Given the military’s strong 
preference for increases in defense spending, as noted earlier, this may indic te that 
                                                
215 TR Cusack, "On the Domestic Political-Economic Sources of American Military Spending," in 
The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, ed. Alex Mintz (New York, NY: 
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we can expect higher military spending under Democratic than Republican 
administrations.  
The theory of issue ownership can also be the rationale that we expect no 
meaningful difference between Republican and Democratic administrations, or 
instead higher defense spending in Democratic administrations.  Studies have 
demonstrated the strategic behaviors of politicians to neutralize negative issue 
ownership images by engaging, rather than avoiding, political and social issues that 
their parties are considered as weak.219  The findings are in line with the argument 
that parties’ issue reputations are not a constant, giving the window of opportunity 
for parties and candidates to reestablish them.220  What this means is that politicians, 
including presidents, may attempt to steal issue ownership possessed by the other 
party or at least mitigate public concerns over issues that they are perceived to be 
weak: hence putting more policy emphasis on the issues.   
Taking into consideration these different theoretical views about the 
relationship between presidential administrations and military spending, this 
dissertation tests in order to determine if a statistically significat increase in defense 
spending occurs under Republican administrations.  This test is done by including a 
dummy variable, with Republican administrations coded as 1 and Democratic 
administrations as 0.  
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(3) Federal Surplus 
 Another factor expected to influence the level of military spending is the 
federal surplus.  The logic is straightforward: the defense budget process is 
influenced by the domestic economic environment.  Policymakers need to consider 
domestic fiscal conditions before deciding an affordable level of spending on 
defense.221  If they try to allocate resources to national defense at the level that is 
much higher than its economic conditions allow, they will face strong domestic 
opposition.   
Previous studies provide partial support for this relationship between the 
level of federal surplus or deficit and military spending.  For example, Hartley and 
Russett found that increases in federal deficits are closely related to a reduction in 
military spending in the United States between 1965 and 1990.222  Ostrom and 
Marra’s study found a similar pattern.  Examining presidential requests for the 
defense budget, they discovered that the size of federal deficit work as “constraint” 
on the amount of defense budget request.223  On the other hand, a study by 
Eichenberg and Stoll shows that the connection between federal budgetary 
conditions and military spending may not be strong.  In an analysis of the 
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determinants of defense spending in the United States and four of its NATO allies, 
they found the deficit was a strong determinant of military spending only in Great 
Britain.224  Thus, the results of this study will provide additional information on 
whether or not defense spending is conditional on macro budgetary constraints.   
For federal surplus or deficit figures, this study uses official government 
budget data provided by the Office of Management and Budget.225  The 
surplus/deficit value for a given year is derived by subtracting outlays from receipts 
and then dividing by GDP.  The surplus/deficit values used in this study range from -
6.0 in 1983 to 2.4 percent in 2000 with positive figures indicating surplus.   
Following the studies mentioned above, I expect that the government will 
decrease military spending under the condition of federal deficit and increase it in 
the existence of a surplus.  A positive coefficient in the results will demonstrate this 
relationship.  Although I am aware that scholars have also used other indicators of 
macro fiscal constraints, such as annual growth in GDP226 and change in revenue227, 
this study only uses federal surplus/deficit for the sake of parsimony.   
 
(4) External Threats 
                                                
224 Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the 
United States and Western Europe." 
225 The data on federal surplus or deficit can be obtained at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals/ (accessed March 25, 2010). Specifically, the data 
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The basic logic behind examining the impact of external threats on defense 
spending is the expectation that states respond to the varying degrees of external
threats by increasing or decreasing military capabilities.  The notion f states’ 
defense policy as a strategic response to external threat has been widely taken in the 
studies of defense spending.  Arms race and balance of power are some of the well 
known concepts to depict this phenomenon.228  Scholars have defined external threat 
in many different ways, and they confirmed the importance of it in explaining the 
level of defense spending.229  Indeed, studies interested in the role that domestic 
political and economic factors play as the determinants of defense spending have 
been attempts to make counterarguments against the dominance of this realist 
approach to accounting for the pattern of resource allocation for national defense.230   
Acknowledging the significance of external threats, this study makes a 
modification to the existing scholarship in terms of how to operationalize the nature
and level of external threat to the U.S. security.  Given that this dissertation attempts 
to examine the determinants of military spending in the U.S. during the period that 
covers the first decade of the post-Cold War era, I find a caveat in the extant 
literature on the U.S. military spending: Most of the research has not taken China 
                                                
228 Cusack and Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's 
Republic of China."; LF Richardson, Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and 
Origins of War (Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood Press, 1960); KN Waltz, Theory of International Politics 
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
229  
230 Benjamin O. Fordham, "Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American 
Cold War Military Spending," The Journal of Politics 64, no. 1 (2002). 
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into consideration.231  This is understandable because the Soviet Union was 
considered the most formidable potential enemy of the U.S.  
This conceptualization of external threat, focusing on the Soviet Union could 
be misleading.  Many studies show that China was deemed important to U.S. foreign 
policy and U.S. allies in Asia long before China began to replace Russia as a 
potential peer competitor of the United States.232  In addition, focusing solely on the 
Soviet Union is not adequate during post-Cold War.  It is necessary to consider 
external threats from both the Soviet Union (now Russia) and China at the same time.  
As a consequence, this dissertation operationalizes the level of external threats as the 
differentials in national capabilities between the combination of the Soviet Union 
and China, on the one hand, and the U.S., on the other hand.  This can provide a 
framework useful both during the Cold War and post-Cold War period. 
As for how to measure the extent of external threat, many scholars have used 
military expenditure as an indicator, but the validity of the measurement has been 
questioned.233  This is especially so in the cases of the Soviet Union and China.  The 
communist regimes have kept secret the overall structure of defense postures, 
including military spending.  Therefore, various western institutions seeking 
                                                
231 Cusack and Ward examined the influence of China’s threat employing defense spending as an 
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information on the military establishments of these states have had to rely on 
different theories of what constitutes defense spending in the Soviet Union and 
China.234  These different theories have created quite diverse estimations of military 
spending.  Comparing five of the most widely used defense spending datasets, for 
instance, Cusack and Ward found that the results of hypothesis tests for the impact of 
military spending of potential enemies on a state’s military expenditure are largely 
dependent on which dataset a researcher uses.235  This shows one should be careful 
in drawing causal inferences from military expenditure data especially covering the 
two countries.  Other scholars raised concerns over the difficulty in obtaining 
reliable military expenditure data on communist states even in the post-Cold War era. 
Bernstein and Munro argued that the actual military expenditure in China is ten 
times larger than the official figure provided by the government.236 
Considering that China needs to be taken seriously and the sensitivity of 
inferences to military spending datasets, this dissertation adopts an alternative 
measurement.  Instead of using the level of military expenditure of the Soviet Union 
and China as an indicator of external threat to the United States, this study emplo s 
the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores in the National Material 
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Capabilities (version 3.02) dataset.237  This dataset is part of Correlates of War 
(COW) project, which has been widely used by scholars in international relations.238  
The level of external threat at a given year is measured by summing the CINC scores 
of the Soviet Union (Russia) and China, and then subtracting the CINC score of the 
United States.   
It is expected that the level of external threat is positively related to the level 
of defense spending in the United States. 
 
(5) War 
Major wars are known to increase defense spending.239  This study considers 
wars that the U.S. was involved.  Following the coding scheme of the Correlates of 
War dataset240, the Korean War and Vietnam War are included as a dummy variable.   
 
(6) The Post-Cold War 
The last control variable is the Post-Cold War.  To test if there is any 
significant difference during and after the Cold War, this study uses a dummy 
variable.  Years until 1989 are coded as 0 and the remaining years are coded as 1. 
                                                
237 The National Material Capabilities dataset (version 3.02) can be obtained at 
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3. Model Specification 
 This study considered the following two theoretical and methodological 
issues to finally decide which model to use: the inclusion of lagged variables and 
autocorrelation. 
A. Inclusion of Lagged Variables 
 First, it is necessary for this study to include lagged variables given the 
nature of the budgetary process.  A particularly relevant aspect of the process is that 
defense budget for a given fiscal year is determined a year before the budget is spent 
or authorized.241  In other words, the level of defense spending at time t is 
determined by factors that exist at time t – 1 or even before that.  An example can 
make this clear.  President Barack Obama sent to Congress his defense budget 
proposal for fiscal year 2010 on May 7, 2009.  After receiving the President’s budget 
request, Congress held hearings to examine whether the President’s proposal was 
sound and manageable given the factors such as economic conditions, and finally 
passed the Congressional Budget Resolution in December 2009.  This shows that 
military spending for fiscal year 2010 is determined by the factors that existed in 
2009.  Inclusion of lagged variables in the model reflects this organizational decision. 
B. Autocorrelation and Differencing 
 Another methodological consideration is the concern for autocorrelation.  As 
previous studies show, using the defense budget data often involves dealing with 
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autocorrelation of the error terms.242  Although we can still get unbiased and 
consistent coefficient estimates, the existence of autocorrelation violates a key 
ordinary least squares (OLS) assumption that the error terms are independent.  The 
violation of this assumption makes significance tests from OLS analyses 
meaningless because the standard errors get underestimated and the t-scores 
overestimated as a consequence.243   
 Researchers have found that inclusion of a lagged dependent variable at times 
addresses autocorrelation because autocorrelation is often the result of mis-
specification.244  Thus, using a lagged dependent variable in this dissertation is 
theoretically and methodologically sound.  It not only captures incrementalism in 
budget process, but it also works as a methodological control mechanism to confront 
autocorrelation. 
 Still, it is possible that autocorrelation remains even after the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable.  To cope with this possibility, this dissertation transforms 
the dependent and independent variables so as to measure ann al changes (∆Y or 
∆Xk), following convention by scholars dealing with defense spending.
245   
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To sum up, this study employs multivariate linear regression analyses and 
use ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques for estimators and significance tests.  In 
order to test each of the hypotheses developed in this study, it formulates the 
following model specification:   
 
∆Defense   




β0 + β1∆Defense Spendingt-1 +β2∆Conservatismt-1 + 
β3∆Elite Veteranst-1 + β4∆Federal Surplust-1 +  
β5Republican Administrationt-1 + β6∆External Threatt-1 + 





Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses that this study tests.  
 
Table 3. Summary of hypotheses 
 
 
Hypotheses (Variable Name in the Models) Direction of Expected 
Effect on defense spending 
 
H1 Intensity of Conservatism (Conservatism) Positive 
H2 Presence of Military Veterans (Elite Veterans) Positive 
H3 
 
Incrementalism in Defense Budgeting (A Lagged 
dependent variable) 
Positive 




H5 Surplus in Federal Budget (Federal Surplus) Positive 











IV. Data Analysis 
 
 
1. Regression Analysis 
Recall that the main research question this dissertation seeks to an wer is this: 
When we control for other factors that potentially impact the annual changes in 
defense spending, can we find evidence that the ideology and military experience 
gap systematically explain the variations of defense spending?  In order to answer
this question, this study employed two proxy measurements of the gaps: strength of 
conservatism in Congress and the proportion of military veterans in the House and 
Cabinet.  This study also defined defense spending in two ways: defense outlays and 
defense budget authority.  Table 4 reports the estimates of ordinary least squ res 
regressions, which indicate no signs of autoregression.246   
Based on the results, the answer to the question above is no.  The analysis 
shows that changes in ideology and military experience in the House and Cabinet do 
not affect annual increase or decrease of defense spending regardless of how we 
define it.   
Intensity of Conservatism.  In the previous chapter, this study hypothesized 
that the intensity of conservatism in Congress would have a positive relationship 
with the level of defense spending.  The results show that the direction of the 
relationship between conservatism in Congress and defense spending is against the 
                                                
246 This study used Stata (version 9.2) for data analyses.  It employed Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, and the results showed no presence of autocorrelation for both models. For the first 
model, chi2 (1) was 0.759 (p > 0.38). For the second model, chi2 (1) was 0.353 (p > 0.55). In order to 
avoid biases from heteroskedasticity, this study employed robust standard errors for both models.  
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hypothesis in both defense outlays and budget authority.  This interpretation, 
however, is not conclusive due to the statistical insignificance of the coefficients. 
Military Experience .  As noted earlier, this study intended to test if 
Fordham’s conclusion that variations in the extent of military experience  does not 
have an independent explicative ability to predict the level of defense spending still 
holds with a more systematic research design.  Fordham in his study took military 
outlays as the dependent variable for a trend analysis between 1951 and 1992 to find 
no clear difference in the pattern of military expenditure across the research 
period.247  This study differs from his study in that it considers a number of control 
variables, an explicit measurement of military experience, and an additional  
indicator of military spending, that is, defense budget authority.  This study also 
extended the research period by covering between 1952 and 2000.  In so doing, this 
study also attempted to examine if Gelpi and Feaver’s conceptualization of the 
prevalence of military experience, which was demonstrated to systematically impact 
the decisions over use of force in their studies, is still applicable to defense 
spending.248  
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    Authorityt  
∆Conservatismt-1 -0.14 -0.12 
 (2.32) (3.58) 
    
∆Elite Veteranst-1 0.10 -0.82 
 (0.53) (0.91) 














    
∆Federal Surplust-1 7.82
† 4.49 
 (4.61) (4.00) 
    
∆External Threatst-1 988.61* 793.11* 
 (465.59) (358.76) 
    
Wart-1 -6.32 -4.29 
 (9.21) (11.72) 
    
Post-Cold Wart-1 5.67 -9.64 
 (13.36) (14.72) 
    
_cons 4.40 16.25 







          The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses  
          are robust standard errors. Significance tests are two-tailed tests.  




This study, however, still does not find a statistically significant relation 
between the prevalence of military experience in Congress and defense sp ding.  
Also, the level of military experience in the political institutions is not an influential 
factor that determines defense spending.  In addition, the proportion of military 
veterans in the House and Cabinet does not exhibit a consistent pattern of 
relationship with the dependent variables.  These results in this regard appear to 
confirm Fordham’s conclusion but question the applicability of Gelpi and Feaver’s 
conceptualization of military experience for explaining phenomena other than 
foreign policy decisions related to use of force in interstate conflicts.   
Budgetary Incrementalism.  In order to test the influence of incrementalist 
spending pressures, this study included lagged dependent variables.  The results 
indicate that the impact of incremental decision making is not a universal 
phenomenon.  As the first column of Table 4 shows, budgetary incrementalism is 
strongly related to defense outlays.  In other words, change in defense outlays in a 
particular year has a strong impact on that in the following year.  This is what the 
conventional wisdom suggest, which has been evidenced by previous findings of the 
importance of incrementalism in budgetary politics concerning defense burden249 
and defense outlays.250  The results of this current study confirm this conventional 
wisdom.   
                                                
249 Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?." 
250 Su, Kamlet, and Mowery, "Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: A 
Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective." 
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The same theoretical factor, however, exerts little influence over budget 
authority, as the second column of Table 4 demonstrates.  Although a complete 
answer to this difference in the role of budgetary Incrementalism is beyond the scope 
of this study, one reason could be outlay-budget authority side payments.  According 
to Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine, presidents often employ a strategy of adjusting 
budget authority as a way to control the level of outlays.251  This is so because the 
growth of federal deficit is an important political issue.  In an effort to educe federal 
deficits, presidents may make a tacit deal with agencies by cutting government 
funding for a particular year, but promising additional spending in the future yeas 
through budget authority.  In other words, “[G]iven periodic concern about budget 
deficit, and consequently spending, the OMB might be tempted to increase agency 
appropriations in exchange for agency acquiescence on lower levels of outlays.”252  
This strategy may make budget authority independent of the previous spending.   
Federal Surplus.  In terms of the influence of federal surplus/deficit on the 
two indicators of defense spending, the relationships are signed in the expected 
positive direction.  As for the significance test, it is shown that only budget outlays 
are closely related to the level of federal surplus at 0.1 level.  Thus, other things
being equal, increases in federal surplus lead to defense outlays increase.  Under the 
                                                
251 DC Mowery, MS Kamlet, and JP Crecine, "Presidential M nagement of Budgetary and Fiscal 
Policymaking," Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 3 (1980). 
252 Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, and Aranson, "A New Approach for Testing Budgetary Incrementalism," 
548. In the similar vein, Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine maintains that “[W]hile outlays represent the 
critical planning variable for fiscal and economic policy in a given year, and thus are of major 
concern to White House personnel, budget authority, because it often carries with it multiyear 
spending implications, may be of far more importance to agency bureaucrats concerned with the long-
run health of their programs.” Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine, "Presidential Management of Budgetary 
and Fiscal Policymaking," 400. 
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condition of federal deficit, the opposite is true.  In budget outlays, holding the other 
variables constant, a 1% increase in federal surplus leads to a growth in outlays by 
about 8 billion dollars, plus or minus 4.7 billion dollars.253  A similar influence of 
federal surplus or deficit is not seen in the case of budget authority.   
Presidential Administration.  The results of particular interest are about the 
impact of partisan control of the executive.  As noted earlier, the expectation that 
Republican administrations spend more on national defense than Democratic 
counterparts is the conventional wisdom.  The coefficients of this variable in Table 4 
shows this is not the case.  There are two interesting findings here.  First, in both 
measures of defense spending, the direction of the relationships is the opposite of 
what the conventional wisdom indicates: It is negative, rather than positive, which 
means that it is under Democratic administrations that we see increase in defnse 
spending.   
Second, the coefficient of presidential administration variable is statistic lly 
significant only in budget authority at 0.1 level (p = 0.052).  The coefficient of the 
same variable fails to pass the significance test in the first model with defense 
outlays as the dependent variable.  The magnitude of the difference between 
Democratic and Republican administrations as for budget authority is substantial.  
                                                
253 This study used the statistical software, CLARIFY, to estimate the impact of changes in the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. King, Tomz, and Wittenberg presented the logic and 
usage of the computer program in their 2000 paper. The software and detailed documentation can be 
obtained by visiting http://GKing.Harvard.Edu (access d 18 February, 2010). Also see G King, M 
Tomz, and J Wittenberg, "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and 
Presentation," American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 2 (2000).  
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Other things being equal, defense budget authority decreases under Republican 
administrations by about 25.6 billion dollars, plus or minus 21 billion dollars.   
External threat.  The most consistent and substantial influence on defense 
spending derives from external threats.  This study expected that annual changes in 
the U.S. defense spending is positively associated with the changes in the national 
material capabilities gap between of the Soviet Union and China combined, on the 
one hand, and that of the U.S., on the other hand.   In other words, it is expected that 
the U.S. defense spending would go up when the capability differential between the 
two communist countries and the U.S increases as a way to make up for the gap.  
The coefficients in both models are significant at 0.05 level. 
As for defense outlays, when the gap in national material capabilities 
increases one standard deviation from the mean, it is expected that the U.S. defense 
outlays would rise up 11.3 billion dollars, plus or minus about 10 billion dollars.   
With regard to budget authority, the rate of change is slightly higher: With the gap 
change of one standard deviation from the mean, it is anticipated that defense budget 
authority would increase by about 12.7 billion dollars, plus or minus 11.4 billion 
dollars.   
War .  The results indicate that wars the United States involved did not lead 
to a statistically significant increase in defense spending.   
Post-Cold War.  The results show that the end of the Cold War did not bring 
about a significant decline in defense spending during the first decade in the Post-
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Cold War era.  Not only do the coefficients fail to pass the significance test, but also 
the direction is not consistent.254   
 
2. Interaction Effects 
Although the previous section of this study showed changes in ideology and 
military experience do not have a statistically significant relationship with defense 
spending, it is still possible that the influence of the variables may be dependent 
upon other variables.  This section examines interaction effects, focusing on the 
relationships between the two main variables of interests of this study and other 
variables—that is, presidential administrations and external threat.  Examining 
interaction effects, I do not discuss the independent effects of variables, following 
the advice that when multiplicative terms are included in an effort to tap into the 
possibility of the existence of interaction effects, it become less important to discuss 
statistical significance of the main variables.255  
Table 5 provides the estimates of regressions on defense outlays, which 
include several interaction terms.  The results indicate that neither the partisan 
control of the executive nor external threat has a statistically significa t nteraction 
effect with strength of conservatism.  However, it shows that there is an interaction 
effect between the percentage of military veterans and external threats at 0.1 level.  
                                                
254 Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the 
United States and Western Europe." 
255 BF Braumoeller, "Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicat ve Interaction Terms," International 
Organization 58, no. 04 (2004). 
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A statistically significant interaction effect is not seen between military veterans and 
the presidential administrations.  
Table 6, however, tells a slightly different story.  It indicates that t e impact 
of ideology on defense budget authority is conditional upon the interaction with the 
partisanship of the president.  The interaction coefficient is significant at the 0.05 
level, and has a positive sign, which demonstrates that budget authority increases as 
conservative ideology gets stronger in Congress under Republican administration .  
As for the interaction between ideology and external threat, the results do not show 
such a statistically significant relationship.   
An equally interesting finding is detected with regard to the interaction of 
elite military veterans with external threats.  As we see from Table 6, th  coefficient 
for the interactive term between the two variables is statistically significant at 0.1 
level (p = 0.056) and positive.  In other words, in a situation where the level of 
external threat increases, the more veterans there are in the Congress and the Cabinet, 
the more likely there will be an increase in defense budget authority.  This indicates 
that the budgetary sensitivity in response to increased external threats is influenced 
by the proportion of military veterans in political institutions.  The coefficient of the 
interaction term for the relationship between military veterans and the presidency is 






The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.  Significance tests are two-tailed tests. The 
constant term was included in the results. Due to the limited space, it was omitted above. † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 5: Interaction effects 1 (first differencing) 
  ∆Defense Outlayst  













































































(117.90) - - 





∆Elite Veteranst-1 × 
∆External Threatst-1 
- - - 
100.84† 
(51.13) 
N /  R-sq 49 / 0.50 49 / 0.50 49 / 0.50 49 / 0.50 
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The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance tests are two-tailed tests. The 
constant term was included in the results. Due to the limited space, it was omitted above. † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 6: Interaction effects 2 (first differencing) 
  ∆Budget Authorityt   













































































(168.22) - - 





∆Elite Veteranst-1 × 
∆External Threatst-1 
- - - 
91.52† 
(60.99) 
N /  R-sq 49 / 0.39 49 / 0.33 50 / 0.32 50 / 0.37 
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3. The Reagan Effect 
An interesting finding that this study has discovered so far is the 
conventional wisdom of an increase in defense spending under Republican 
administrations is not correct.  This is in stark contrast with the relatively recent 
memory of an unprecedented military buildup during the Reagan administration.  
Indeed, his presidency left an indelible mark on civil-military relations.  Some 
scholars argue that Reagan saved the military from the agony of the Vietnam War.  
Colin Powell once complimented Reagan for his emphasis on the importance of the 
military by saying “[F]or me … Ronald Reagan will always be the president who 
restored the fighting strength and spirit of America’s Armed Forces.”256  The way 
Reagan approached the military and military matters was so different from Carter 
that it created an image of “clear differences between the parties in their approaches 
to defense and national security policy questions and, equally visibly, their devotion 
to traditional military values.”257  This difference leads some scholars to conclude 
that Reagan’s efforts to rebuild the military out of the trauma of Vietnam could be 
ascribed as the cause of Republicanization of the military.258   
Indeed, the defense buildup during the Reagan administration was quite 
noticeable.   Defense budget authority in 1985 was twice as much as that of 1980 in 
                                                
256 Quoted in Bacevich and Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans - Has the US Military Become a 
Partisan Force," 24. 
257 Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq", 117. 
258 Holsti, "Politicization of the United States Military-Crisis or Tempest in a Teapot."; Holm, 
"Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq". 
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nominal terms, increasing in real terms by almost 55 percent.259  During the same 
period, the annual growth rate of defense budget was nearly 9.3 percent in real terms.  
Whereas defense budget rose significantly, domestic discretionary spending decli ed 
from 5.7 in 1981to 3.8 percent in 1987.260   
Given the findings in the previous sections, a significant increase in defense 
spending under a Republican administration is an anomaly.  In an effort to examine 
the impact of the Reagan administration on the defense spending trend, I reran the 
models with Reagan’s first and second terms excluded, and compared the restricted 
models with the original ones.   
Table 7 provides the results of the original and revised models.  Three 
findings are of particular interests.  First, as the comparison of the model (1) with 
model (2) shows, while the coefficient of the presidential administration variable 
was not statistically significant in the original model, it is significant t 0.1 level in 
the revised model (p = 0.09).  In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient almost 
doubles, meaning that the difference in the size of defense spending between 
Republican and Democratic administrations becomes much bigger with the years 
under the Reagan administration not included in the model.  The same effect is also 
found in the model (3) and (4).  With defense budget authority as the dependent 
                                                
259 Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, "Playing the Add-on Game in Congress: The 
Increasing Importance of Constituent Interests and Bu get Constraints in Determining Defense 
Policy," in The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense Spending, ed. Leon V. Sigal (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 1999). 
260 D Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Pr., 1992). 
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variable, the size of the coefficient for the presidency is much larger in the revis d 
model (4) than the original model (3).   
Second, model (5) examines the interaction effect of the partisan control of 
the presidency with ideology without Reagan years in the model.  In the original 
model in Table 6, the coefficient of the interaction term was significant at 0.05 level.  
The model (5) in Table 7 indicates that this interaction effect in the original model is 
largely due to the Reagan administration.  Without including the years under 
President Reagan, the interaction effect is no longer statistically significant.   
Third, the interaction effect between the level of military experience and 
external threats gets stronger without the Reagan years.  In the original model of 
Table 6, the coefficient for the interaction term was statistically significant at 0.1 
level (p = 0.054).  In the revised model (6) in Table 7, the interaction effect is much 
stronger, being significant at 0.01 level (p = 0.005).  In addition, I find that the 
magnitude of the coefficient is much larger in the revised model (110.56) than in the 
original model (97.93).   
In sum, the Regan era is important in understanding the factors that influence 
defense spending.  It showed a very different pattern of defense spending than the 
previous Republican administrations in terms of the size of defense spending.  It was 
also an important period in which the interaction effect between the rise of 




The models used the same independent variables that were employed in the previous models. The results above show only the variables of interest. The 
models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance tests are two-tailed tests.  
† p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 7: Reagan effects 1 (first differencing) 

























       



























       












       












       
∆Conservatismt-1 × 
Republican Admint-1 
- - - - 
4.02 
(7.20) - 
       
∆Elite Veteranst-1 × 
∆External Threatst-1 
- - - - - 
110.14** 
(38.66) 













N /  R-sq 49 / 0.50 41 / 0.53 49 / 0.33 41 / 0.46 41 / 0.47 41 / 0.51 
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Given these findings, one might be tempted to draw a conclusion that the 
interaction effect between ideology and the presidency is temporary, largely limited 
to the Reagan administrations.  One may further want to conclude that there is no 
interaction effect in general.  Is this a fair conclusion?  Some scholars ave 
demonstrated that aggregate spending data may underestimate the dynamics of 
defense budget changes that exist in the subcategories.  For example, Kanter found 
that Congress tended to have a larger influence on Procurement as well as Rese rch, 
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) subfunctions than Personnel and 
Operations and Management (O&M).261   
In order to further investigate whether the interaction effect of ideology with 
the partisan control of the presidency is restricted to the Reagan administration, I 
employed disaggregate defense spending data.  Because the defense outlays dataset 
used in this study does not allow in-depth analyses on disaggregate data, I used 
detailed information on annual spending levels of subfunctions that the original 
budget authority dataset provides.  The data on subfunctions cover the period 
between 1957 and 2000.  As was the case with an examination of the Reagan effect 
above, I excluded the Reagan terms and reran the models with the same independent 
variables and an interaction term for ideology and the presidency.   
 Table 8 shows the estimates of the restricted models having five major 
budget authority subfunctions as the dependent variables.  In four out of five 
subfuctions, a statistically meaningful interaction effect was found.  In other words, 
                                                
261 Kanter, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960-197." 
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even though excluding the Reagan terms from the models made the interaction effect 
nonexistent at the aggregate level, the same effect was still present in some of the 
subfunctions.  As expected, the direction of the relationship was positive, meaning 
that under Republican administrations, increase in conservatism leads to growh of 
defense budget authority.  Specifically, in such subfunctions as Military Personnel, 
Procurement, RDT&E, and Military Construction, the interaction effect was 
significant at 0.05 level.  No such statistically meaningful relationship was found in 
Operation and Management (O&M) subfuction.  As Kanter correctly noted, this 
shows that focusing on aggregate spending data may make researchers underestimat  
the existence of causal relationships at the disaggregated level.  In sum, it see s safe 
to conclude from Table 8 that the interaction effect between conservatism and the 
Republican presidents represents a consistent characteristic of resource allocation in 





a: RDT&E indicates Research, Development, Testing, a d Evaluation. The models used the same independent variables that were employed in the 
previous models. The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance 
tests are two-tailed tests. Due to the limited space, constants in the equations are omitted above. † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 8: Reagan effects 2 (first differencing) 















































































































      






This study began because of the sparse scholarly information about the role 
that civil-military gap plays on military effectiveness.  To the extent hat scholars 
have examined the topic, I found that studies either focused on topics not directly 
related to military effectiveness or had theoretical and methodological weaknesses 
such as ambiguous causal mechanism and omission of relevant variables.  As a 
consequence, I argued that it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about 
whether or not the civil-military gap matters in explaining the level of military 
effectiveness.   
The lack of systematic evidence appears to have created a perception that any
perceived gap matters among proponents of gap thesis.  Critics have argued that 
proponents of gap thesis have not found enough evidence that proves the causal 
relationship between the civil-military gap and military effectiveness.  They, 
however, have neglected to provide evidence that civil-military gap does not matter.  
The lack of attention to empirical analyses of the civil-military gap and its influence 
on military effectiveness is not only detrimental to the scholarship of civil-military 
relations, but it also may have serious practical impacts on policy when it oversates 
the implications of civil-military gap.  As a result of the lack of research, the subfield 
of civil-military relations could be described as ignorant regarding the implications 
of civil-military gap for military effectiveness.  What scholars need to do is to 
122 
 
identify the existence and extent of policy-relevant gaps.  In doing so, they will be 
able to dissect the myth associated with the implications of the civil-military gap.  
In an effort to fill this void in civil-military relations literature, this study 
examined the influence of two types of civil-military gaps on military effectiveness: 
ideology and military experience gap.  Accepting the basic logic of proponents of 
gap thesis, I hypothesized that the size of civil-military gap has an inverse 
relationship with defense spending.  When there is a small civil-military gap, it is 
expected that civilians and the military possess a common understanding about 
measures to enhance military effectiveness, leading to increases in defense spending.  
With a substantial civil-military gap, decreases in defense spending are anticipated.  
I further theorized that the impact of these civil-military gaps is manifested in 
defense spending through political institutions.   
Specifically, this study came up with the following hypotheses.  First, I 
hypothesized that the strength of conservatism in the U.S. Congress—a proxy 
measure for the ideology gap—has a positive relationship with defense spending.  I 
expected that given the military’s conservatism and its preference for a higher 
military spending, as conservatism gets stronger in Congress, the ideological gap 
will be reduced, which will lead to defense spending increases.  Second, this study 
also hypothesized that the proportion of military veterans in the United StatesHouse 
and Cabinet—a proxy measure for military experience gap—is positively associ ted 
with defense spending.  Given the similarity between military personnel and military 
veterans, in terms of values and perspectives toward the adequate level of military
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spending, it was expected that as the proportion of military veterans gets higher, the 
military experience gap shrinks.  As a consequence, defense spending increases.   
I tested these two hypotheses by employing multivariate Ordinary Least 
Squares regression analyses with defense outlays and defense budget authority s the 
indicators of military spending.  The research period was between 1952 and 2000, 
focusing on the case of the United States.  This study included a number of control 
variables such a lagged dependent variable, partisan control of the presidency, and 
external threats in order to estimate the effect of ideology and military experience 
gap with precision.   
The results demonstrated the need for a more nuanced understanding of the 
effect of the ideology and military experience gap on defense spending.  First, this 
study found that, in opposition to Huntington’s theories, ideology did not have a 
main effect on defense outlays and defense budget authority.  Contrary to Feaver’s 
criticism of Huntington, however, it also found that there is an interaction effect 
between ideology and the presidency.  To be specific, under Republican 
administrations, as conservatism in Congress intensifies, budget authority increases.  
With defense outlays as the dependent variable, this study did not find any 
interaction effect between ideology and partisan control of the presidency.  Thus, 
this study yields evidence of a limited role of ideology gap on defense spending. 
Second, this study also demonstrated that there is a limited impact of military 
experience gap on defense spending.  No significant main effect of the military 
experience gap was found in both measures of defense spending, confirming 
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Fordham’s findings.262  This study, however, provides evidence that an interaction 
effect between the level of military experience in political institutions and external 
threats on both measures of defense spending exists.  This suggests that Fordham’s 
conclusion needs to be revisited in light of the findings of this study.  
Third, this study provided evidence that challenges conventional wisdom 
about the difference between Republican and Democratic administrations in terms of 
defense spending patterns.  Some scholars studying civil-military relations have 
raised concerns about the potential negative effects on defense spending under 
Democratic administrations.263  Part of the reason for the concerns is the ideological 
distance between Democratic administrations and the military given the prevalence 
of conservatism, especially in the officer corps.  According to this logic, a more
favorable defense budget condition is expected under Republican administrations.  
The results of this study do not support this view.  Instead, under Democratic 
administrations defense budget authority increased between 1952 and 2000.  A 
statistically significant increase under Democratic administrat ons was not detected 
in defense outlays.  Possible reasons for this finding will be discussed in the next 
section.   
Fourth, this study examined the impact of the Reagan administration and 
found the Reagan era was a significant departure from previous Republican 
                                                
262 Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on 
Peacetime Military Policy." 
263 Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the 
Start of a New Millennium."; Bacevich and Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans: Has the US 
Military Become a Partisan Force?." 
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administrations with regard to defense spending.  When I excluded the Reagan years 
from the model, the results showed were statistically meaningful that Republican 
administrations spent less on defense spending—both defense outlays and budget 
authority—than Democratic administration.  In addition, the results presented 
evidence that previously observable interaction effects between ideology and 
partisan control of the presidency lost its statistical significance, although the 
interaction term for military veterans and external threats remained significant.  The 
fact that the interaction effect between ideology in Congress and the presidency 
vanished when I excluded the Reagan era makes it difficult to draw a conclusion 
about this effect.  In order to further investigate the influence of the Reagan terms on 
defense spending patterns, this study employed the disaggregated budget authority 
data to find that the interaction effect was present in four of five budget authority 
subfunctions.  This finding proved that although the interaction effect at the 
aggregate level is dependent upon the Reagan terms, the same effect is a consistent 
pattern at the disaggregated level regardless of whether or not the Reagan 
administrations are included.  Overall, the findings demonstrated that Republican 
administrations except for the Reagan administrations had a tendency to spend less 
on national defense than Democratic administration.  Furthermore, it provided 
evidence that the interaction effect between ideology and the presidential 




Because the Reagan administration is an outlier in defense spending patterns, 
the findings problematize the idea of visiting the Reagan administration in order t  
deduce what the budget priorities of a Republican administration would look like.264  
If the history is any indication, the results suggest that there is little reason to expect 
a significant increase in defense spending under Republican administrations.  
Furthermore, the findings suggest that understanding the relationship between the 
military and presidential administrations from the ideological perspective—which is 
quite prevalent in civil-military relations literature—needs to be reexamined.  On the 
defense spending issue, the opposite of the conventional wisdom is true.     
Last, this study found the importance of some control variables in explaining 
changes in defense spending.  In particular, this study revealed that external thr at 
has a consistent and substantial impact on defense spending.  This study also 
observed that budgetary incrementalism and federal deficit are important factors for 
defense outlays but not for defense budget authority.  This difference seems to derive 
from the different nature of the two defense spending measures.  In particular, it 
appears that political institutions strategically use budget authority as a mechanism 
to control the level of expenditure, which has an important political bearing on 
national debates about fiscal and budgetary policies.265     
 
2. Implications of the Findings 
                                                
264 Kurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security 
(New York: Basic Books, 2006), xi; Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from 
Vietnam to Iraq". 
265 Kanter, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960-197." 
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The notion that ideology is an important determinant of opinions and voting 
decisions at the individual level is widely held.  When it comes to defense spending, 
however, previous studies have found little evidence to support the significance of 
changes in ideology at the institutional level, particularly in Congress.266  In fact, in 
most of those quantitative studies, the variable of ideological variations in Congress 
was not the main analytical focus.  Rather, it was one of control variables, reflecting 
a lack of attention to the role that ideology plays on defense spending.  The findings 
of this study concerning the interactive relationship between ideology, the 
presidency, and defense spending are a valuable contribution not only to the 
scholarship of civil-military relations but also to the studies of the determinants of 
defense spending. 
What do these results mean for the gap thesis literature?  As noted earlier, the 
ideological gap and its implications for military effectiveness are some of the focal 
points in the studies of civil-military gap.  This study does not find any main effect 
of the ideological gap challenges claims made by proponents of gap thesis.  In this
regard, it seems that proponents of gap thesis have exaggerated the role that the 
ideological gap plays on military effectiveness.  Although this study demonstrated 
the existence of an interaction effect between ideology and the presidency, this effect 
does not seem to be a decisive factor in determining the level of defense spending.  
In this regard, the results of this study are reassuring because they suggestthat the 
                                                
266 Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the 
United States and Western Europe."; Su, Kamlet, and Mowery, "Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal 
Policy Outcomes: A Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective." 
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resource allocation pattern in Congress has not been shaped by the ideological gap 
except under certain conditions.  To sum it up, the results indicate that there is littl  
reason to worry about the implications of ideological gap for defense spending.   
Another important contribution that this dissertation found is an interaction 
effect between the military experience gap and external threats on defense spending.  
So far, the relationship between the extent of military experience in political 
institutions and defense spending has received little scholarly attention, and this 
study was an effort to fill this void.   
The findings related to the military experience gap merit fu ther investigation.  
The decline of military veterans in the United States has been well documented and 
viewed with great concern.267  This was especially so during the 1990s when, as 
noted in Chapter One, many policy controversies concerning military policies and 
foreign policy decisions were regarded as symptoms of a seemingly inevitabl  
conflict between the military and  society with little understanding of military 
matters.  Given what seems to be an irreversible trend, the policy implication of the 
decrease of military veterans has been an important topic in civil-military relations 
literature.   
The findings of this current study help ease the concerns of those who worry 
about potential adverse effects of decrease of military veterans on defense spending.  
As shown earlier, the proportion of military veterans in political institutions did not 
                                                
267 Bianco and Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. 
Congress."; Bianco, "Last Post for" the Greatest Generation": The Policy Implications of the Decline 
of Military Experience in the US Congress."; Eitelbrg and Little, "Influential Elites and the 
American Military after the Cold War." 
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have an independent impact on the level of military spending.  This study found an 
interaction effect between the level of military experience and external threat, but 
this impact does not appear to be a key variable that dictates the scale of defense 
spending.  In this regard, this study demystifies an unwarranted apprehension 
concerning the decreasing number of military veterans and its implication on 
resource allocation. 
Indeed, despite empirical findings showing the difference in values and 
perspectives between military veterans and their nonveteran counterparts, studies 
examining policy implications of military experience have found little evid nce of 
veteran effects.  Most of the studies examining policy effects of military experience 
have focused on whether or not military experience has an independent impact on 
legislators’ voting decisions.  For instance, Bianco and Markham found that veterans 
are not much different from nonveterans in congressional voting decisions on 
defense spending, defense policy, and foreign policy in the 102nd to 104th Congress.  
They further argued that it is difficult to recognize any discernable patt rns of 
difference that military experience may generate even when they grouped the votes 
depending on the nature of issues (e.g. culture or military lifestyle).  This led them to 
conclude that military experience may have indirect rather than direct impact on 
policy for example, in agenda settings in congressional committees.268   
This study is one of the few that tested the hypothesis about the relationship 
between the prevalence of military experience in political institutions and actual 
                                                




defense spending.  It provides further evidence of limited role of prior military 
service on policy outcomes.  Teisen argued that military veterans’ preference for 
increased military preparedness is the most consistent finding in analyses of values 
and opinions of military veterans.269  If Teisen is correct, the causal connection 
between the prevalence of military experience in political institutions and military 
spending should be easily confirmed.  As the results of this study indicate, the 
impact of military experience is not direct.  Rather, it may be situational, as the 
interaction effect suggests.   
The interactive effect between the level of military experience and external 
threats presents a possibility that military service may provide former members of 
the military with a latent characteristic.  In order to be effective, it needs to be 
activated by either certain social and political situations.  The finding of an
interaction of military experience with external threats suggests that the influence of 
military experience on defense spending might become effective when there is a 
sense of heightened insecurity, as the external threats intensify. 
Although civil-military relations literature does not have a direct answer to 
this interaction effect, some previous studies may help us understand this 
phenomenon.  According to Holsti, a strong militant internationalism exists among 
military officers, which emphasizes “a world of conflict, and the necessity to be 
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prepared and willing to use force to address it.”270  A similar finding of strong 
support for use of force was also evidenced among people considering a military 
career.271  It was found that among American youth, those willing to serve the 
military were more likely to support the idea of U.S. military supremacy than others 
not considering a military career.  Furthermore, Segal et al. found that by comparing 
the changes of political attitudes of enlisted military personnel to those of civilian 
peers, enlistees tended to have a higher level of military interventionism before 
entering the military and while in military service.272  To the extent that military 
veterans keep this preference, it may become intensified when international threats 
increase.  When there is little concern for outside threats, the preference for military 
intervention and other policy preferences related to it (e.g., defense spending) may 
be dormant.  With an increased sense of external threats, military veterans may 
strongly feel obliged or pressured to prepare for military intervention, thus leading to 
increase in defense spending.   
Gelpi and Feaver’s study provide further insight into this phenomenon.273  
They found that the proportion of military veterans in the House and Cabinet has a 
positive relationship with the size of military force used in interstate conflits in the 
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United States.  They argued that the preference of military veterans for a larger 
military force to be employed in military conflicts derives from the prference for a 
decisive military victory.  If this is true, it may be that under the condition of 
increased external threats, political institutions with a higher percentage of military 
veterans are likely to increase defense spending in an effort to seek a decisive vi tory.   
In any case, it seems apparent that the decline of military veterans does not 
seriously undermine military effectiveness when the latter is defined as defense 
spending.  Although Gelpi and Feaver found the extent of military experience in 
political institutions has an important direct impact on decisions related to use f 
force, it does not seem to have an influence on defense spending.  The findings thus 
suggest another approach to veterans’ behaviors on defense spending.  In addition to 
a direct effect of military experience, a search for possible interaction effects with 
political and economic conditions could be equally fruitful.   
The findings that show a systematic difference in defense spending pattern 
between Democratic and Republican administrations also deserve further comments.  
Why is the conventional wisdom wrong?  I suggest two possible answers to this 
difference.  First, some scholars have found that Democratic and Republican 
presidents have sought different types of military strategy and force structure as a 
way to build and maintain political coalitions.274  To be specific, scholars found that 
whereas Democratic presidents emphasized building conventional military forces, 
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Republican preferred force structure with air power and nuclear weapons capabilities 
as the main pillars.  For example, President Eisenhower, who inherited massive 
amount of federal budget deficit from the Truman administration, won political 
support by promising significant reduction in the overall government expenditure 
and defense spending in particular.  The so-called “New Look” for a defense orce 
posture was the solution.275  This policy, which is well known as the strategy of 
massive retaliation, emphasized utilizing strategic air power and nuclear weapons, 
enabling the President to cut funding for conventional forces.  In other words, 
Eisenhower attempted to balance the demands for national security and budget by 
stressing the strategic force structure, which required a smaller defense budget than a 
conventional force posture. 
This trade-off between strategic and conventional force was reversed during 
the Kennedy administration.  The Democratic President redirected force stru ture by 
pursuing the so-called strategy of flexible response, which put more emphasis on the 
importance of conventional force.276  Importantly, this reorientation of military 
strategy was a reflection not only of a different look at how to best deal with the 
Soviet threat but also of the Kennedy administration’s fiscal policy.  A largeincr ase 
in military spending, especially on a conventional force, during the Kennedy 
administration echoed the Democratic Party’s policy perspective that economic 
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development, which would reduce unemployment, could be maintained via 
expansion in government spending.   
What these examples indicate is that there is a partisan difference between 
Democratic and Republican presidents with regard to military strategy and force 
structure, and this difference has significant implications on the size and substance of 
defense spending.  Fordham’s study provides systematic evidence for this trade-off 
between strategic and conventional force posture derived from partisan 
differences.277  It is important to note that this discussion of the trade-off presents a 
possible explanation for my results: the level of defense spending was significantly 
higher under Democratic administrations than Republican.  Given the strategic 
emphasis on conventional military force, which requires more resources than 
strategic weapons systems to build and maintain, Democratic administrations spent 
more on national defense than Republican administrations.   
The second possible explanation for increase in defense spending under 
Democratic presidents can be found in a theoretical synthesis of principal-agent 
models and issue ownership thesis.  Rationalist principal-agent approach has recently 
been regarded as an alternative to the traditional civil-military relations heories in 
which Huntington and Janowitz are the towering figures.278  In particular, Feaver’s 
agency theory argues that the relative influence of the political principals vis-à-vis 
the military is shaped by the following three factors: the preference gap, the 
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possibility of punishment when the principals find the shirking of the military, and 
the modes of monitoring mechanisms (intrusive vs. non-intrusive).279   
Particularly relevant to this dissertation is the first two variables.  Various 
combinations of the preference gap and the punishability produce different outcomes 
for decision making.  Civil-military controversies during the Clinton administration 
over foreign policy decisions related to interventions in Haiti and Kosovo can be 
explained employing the two factors.  According to agency theory, in the Clinton 
administration, the preference gap between civilians and the military was wide, as 
was the case during the Cold War era.  Yet, the military’s expectation of punishment 
was substantially low due to the perceptions among the public and in the military 
that President Clinton was weak on defense issues.  The combination of these two 
factors led to the shirking of the military, which was manifested when the military 
was trying to impose its own preference for use of force on decision making process.   
A recent study by Holm attempted to create a theoretical synthesis of 
Feaver’s agency model and the issue ownership thesis in order to explain how the 
military’s political party affiliation distorts policy outcomes.  Holm argued that the 
size of the policy preference gap between the military and the presidents is 
dependent upon the party of the president.280  This is a modified version of Feaver’s 
agency theory because Feaver claims the preference gap between civilia s and the 
military remains at the same width regardless of who the civilians are.281  Holm 
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maintained that under the Democratic control of the presidency, the preference gap 
tends to diverge whereas the opposite is true under the Republican presidents 
because of the military’s Republican Party affiliation.  The increased policy 
preference gap between the military and the Democratic presidents may intensify 
civil-military conflicts over the policy directions.   
Lacking ownership over issues of national defense, the Democratic 
presidents may attempt to minimize civil-military conflicts by compromising their 
policy goals and producing policy outcomes closer to the preference of the 
military.282  The Democratic presidents may disregard military advice or even punish 
the leadership of the military over civil-military disagreements.  YetHolm argues 
that Democratic presidents are more likely to be incentivized to take compromised 
positions due to their perceived weaker images on national defense.  For Democratic 
presidents, policy disputes with the military would further undermine public 
confidence for their government over military matters.  Thus, by deferring to 
military officers to avoid conflicts, the Democratic presidents can create an image of 
enjoying harmonious civil-military relations, and gain public support.  Bacevich 
appears to agree with this line of thought when he says that “in comparison to their
Republican counterparts, [Democrats] are at least as deferential to military officers 
and probably more reluctant to question claims of military expertise.”283   
                                                
282 JR Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," American 
Journal of Political Science 40, no. 3 (1996); Urben, "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: 
Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms". 
283  AJ Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).This quote was cited by Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and 
Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq", 54.  
137 
 
In contrast to the Democratic presidents’ perceived need to appear in 
harmony with the military, the issue ownership theorists expect that Republican 
administrations will have an advantage in dealing with the military.  Given the 
public perception of their competence in defense and national security matters, the 
Republican presidents will have more leeway when they interact with the military 
leadership: they can use the threat of punishment—an important means of civilian 
control of the military—under less constraints than the Democratic presidents.  The 
perception of the higher possibility of punishment under Republican administrations 
may provide the military with incentives to agree with civilians’ policy preferences, 
instead of challenging them.  As a consequence, the military’s influence on policy 
outcomes would diminish under Republican administrations.   
Holm’s argument can be applied to the finding of this study: If we assume 
that the level of defense spending indicates the extent of military influence284, a 
greater increase in defense spending under Democratic administrations can be 
explained by a theoretical combination of principal-agent models and issue 
ownership thesis.  Due to the public perception that they lack competence in military 
policies, and because this creates a condition in which they feel constrained in using 
the threat or actual use of punishment against the military, Democratic pres dents 
may be more willing to accept the military’s preference than their R publican 
counterparts.  This seems to explain a higher military spending under the Democratic 
administrations than the Republican ones. 
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To summarize, the results of this study suggest that the complexity of defense 
budget politics requires a modification of the conventional wisdom associated with 
ideology, military experience, and the partisan control of the presidency.  In 
particular, it is important to note that the civil-military gap is one of many f ctors 
that influence the level of defense spending.  Although the study presents a set of
interesting findings that demand further investigation, probably the most important 
finding is that the impact of civil-military gap on defense spending is limited, 
contrary to the expectation of the proponents of gap thesis.   
I treated defense spending as an element of military effectiveness.  Military 
effectiveness has many dimensions and factors, and that indicates that there are a 
wide range of questions that await attention from scholars studying civil-military 
relations, the gap thesis in particular.  It is apparent that not all civil-military gaps are 
policy-relevant.  Even when they have relevance, the relationship of the gaps with 
policy outcomes may be limited or against expectations.  Without empirical studie , 
however, we cannot rule out the null hypothesis that civil-military gaps have 
important policy implications.  As Nielson correctly pointed out, the preoccupation 
with civilian control of the military among scholars of civil-military relations has left 
many important areas—including military effectiveness—understudied.285  This bias 
in the current scholarship of civil-military relations should be corrected by future 
studies.  
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3. Suggestions for Future Studies 
This dissertation makes two suggestions for future studies.  First, a 
theoretical synthesis of principal-agent models and issue ownership thesis can be a 
fruitful area of research in civil-military relations literature.  In the previous section, 
I combined the two theoretical approaches to provide a possible explanation for the 
difference in defense spending patterns between Democratic and Republican 
administrations.  A future study can explicitly test this tentative explanation by 
employing a more dynamic concept of issue ownership.  I adopted a static concept of 
issue ownership, suggesting that Democratic presidents are under more constraints 
than Republican counterparts when controlling the military agent.  However, some 
studies found that issue ownership is not static, but changeable.286  Particularly 
relevant is the influence of presidents’ performance on the perception of issue 
ownership and its implication with regard to military spending.  The changing extent 
of issue ownership due to successes and failures in defense policies and military 
operations may bring about varying degrees of constraints and opportunities for 
presidents.  In other words, although the party of the president is a structural factor in 
claiming issue ownership, the public perception on how competently that president is 
dealing with military and security issues at a given time may determin  the degree of 
political maneuvering of presidents, at least temporarily.  In sum, theorizing the 
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relationship between the dynamics of issue ownership and military spending, as well 
as other aspects of civil-military relations, is an area that awaits scholarly efforts.   
Second, the possibility of military experience as a latent variable needs to be 
fully examined.  A particularly interesting area of study would be the political 
behavior of military veterans concerning election and vote choices.  In these research 
areas, scholars have found mixed results about the influence of military veterans on 
political behaviors.287  Theorizing the impact of military experience as a variable to 
be activated under certain political, economic and social conditions will broaden our 
understanding of what it means to be a military veteran in one’s political life.   
As this study showed, external threat as a potential factor that triggers the 
veteran effect can be a useful starting point.  Studies of the role of perceived threats
on behaviors have found that in the face of threat of mortality, people tend to take a 
conservative outlook as a way to eliminate uncertainty and to defend themselves.288  
In this sense, Jost et al. define political conservatism as “motivated social 
cognition.”289  If this tendency is true, it may be the case that military veterans are 
those who sensitively respond to external political threats due to their somewhat 
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cautious perspective toward interstate relations.290  This increased conservatism 
among military veterans may lead to a higher support for government policies and 
presidents than other subgroups.   
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